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I. Introduction 
Multidrug-resistant organisms(MDROs), including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) and certain gram-negative bacilli 
(GNB) have important infection control implications that either have not been addressed or 
received only limited consideration in previous isolation guidelines. Increasing experience 
with these organisms is improving understanding of the routes of transmission and effective 
preventive measures. Although transmission of MDROs is most frequently documented in 
acute care facilities, all healthcare settings are affected by the emergence and transmission 
of antimicrobial-resistant microbes. The severity and extent of disease caused by these 
pathogens varies by the population(s) affected and by the institution(s) in which they are 
found. Institutions, in turn, vary widely in physical and functional characteristics, ranging 
from long-term care facilities (LTCF) to specialty units (e.g., intensive care units [ICU], burn 
units, neonatal ICUs [NICUs]) in tertiary care facilities. Because of this, the approaches to 
prevention and control of these pathogens need to be tailored to the specific needs of each 
population and individual institution. The prevention and control of MDROs is a national 
priority - one that requires that all healthcare facilities and agencies assume responsibility(1) 
(2).  The following discussion and recommendations are provided to guide the 
implementation of strategies and practices to prevent the transmission of MRSA, VRE, and 
other MDROs. The administration of healthcare organizations and institutions should ensure 
that appropriate strategies are fully implemented, regularly evaluated for effectiveness, and 
adjusted such that there is a consistent decrease in the incidence of targeted MDROs. 
Successful prevention and control of MDROs requires administrative and scientific 
leadership and a financial and human resource commitment(3-5).  Resources must be 
made available for infection prevention and control, including expert consultation, laboratory 
support, adherence monitoring, and data analysis. Infection prevention and control 
professionals have found that healthcare personnel (HCP) are more receptive and adherent 
to the recommended control measures when organizational leaders participate in efforts to 




MDRO definition. For epidemiologic purposes, MDROs are defined as microorganisms, 
predominantly bacteria, that are resistant to one or more classes of antimicrobial agents (1). 
Although the names of certain MDROs describe resistance to only one agent (e.g., MRSA, 
VRE), these pathogens are frequently resistant to most available antimicrobial agents . 
These highly resistant organisms deserve special attention in healthcare facilities (2). In 
addition to MRSA and VRE, certain GNB, including those producing extended spectrum 
beta-lactamases (ESBLs) and others that are resistant to multiple classes of antimicrobial 
agents, are of particular concern.1 In addition to Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae, 
these include strains of Acinetobacter baumannii resistant to all antimicrobial agents, or all 
except imipenem,(6-12), and organisms such as Stenotrophomonas maltophilia (12-14), 
Burkholderia cepacia (15, 16), and Ralstonia pickettii(17) that are intrinsically resistant to the 
broadest-spectrum antimicrobial agents. In some residential settings (e.g., LTCFs), it is 
important to control multidrug-resistant S. pneumoniae (MDRSP) that are resistant to 
penicillin and other broad-spectrum agents such as macrolides and fluroquinolones (18, 19).  
Strains of S. aureus that have intermediate susceptibility or are resistant to vancomycin (i.e., 
vancomycin-intermediate S. aureus [VISA], vancomycin-resistant S. aureus [VRSA]) (20-30) 
have affected specific populations, such as hemodialysis patients.  
 
Clinical importance of MDROs. In most instances, MDRO infections have clinical 
manifestations that are similar to infections caused by susceptible pathogens. However, 
options for treating patients with these infections are often extremely limited. For example, 
until recently, only vancomycin provided effective therapy for potentially life-threatening 
MRSA infections and during the 1990’s there were virtually no antimicrobial agents to treat 
infections caused by VRE.  Although antimicrobials are now available for treatment of 
MRSA and VRE infections, resistance to each new agent has already emerged in clinical 
                                            
1 Multidrug-resistant strains of M. tuberculosis are not addressed in this document because of the markedly different patterns of 
transmission and spread of the pathogen and the very different control interventions that are needed for prevention of M. tuberculosis 




isolates(31-37). Similarly, therapeutic options are limited for ESBL-producing isolates of 
gram-negative bacilli, strains of A. baumannii resistant to all antimicrobial agents except 
imipenem(8-11, 38) and intrinsically resistant Stenotrophomonas sp.(12-14, 39). These 
limitations may influence antibiotic usage patterns in ways that suppress normal flora and 
create a favorable environment for development of colonization when exposed to potential 
MDR pathogens (i.e., selective advantage)(40).  
 
Increased lengths of stay, costs, and mortality also have been associated with MDROs (41-
46). Two studies documented increased mortality, hospital lengths of stay, and hospital 
charges associated with multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacilli (MDR-GNBs), including an 
NICU outbreak of ESBL-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae (47) and the emergence of third-
generation cephalosporin resistance in Enterobacter spp. in hospitalized adults (48). 
Vancomycin resistance has been reported to be an independent predictor of death from 
enterococcal bacteremia(44, 49-53). Furthermore, VRE was associated with increased 
mortality, length of hospital stay, admission to the ICU, surgical procedures, and costs when 
VRE patients were compared with a matched hospital population (54).  
 
However, MRSA may behave differently from other MDROs. When patients with MRSA 
have been compared to patients with methicillin-susceptible S. aureus (MSSA), MRSA-
colonized patients more frequently develop symptomatic infections(55, 56). Furthermore, 
higher case fatality rates have been observed for certain MRSA infections, including 
bacteremia(57-62), poststernotomy mediastinitis(63), and surgical site infections(64). These 
outcomes may be a result of delays in the administration of vancomycin, the relative 
decrease in the bactericidal activity of vancomycin(65), or persistent bacteremia associated 
with intrinsic characteristics of certain MRSA strains (66). Mortality may be increased further 
by S. aureus with reduced vancomycin susceptibility (VISA) (26, 67). Also some studies 
have reported an association between MRSA infections and increased length of stay, and 
healthcare costs(46, 61, 62), while others have not(64).  Finally, some hospitals have 
observed an increase in the overall occurrence of staphylococcal infections following the 
introduction of MRSA into a hospital or special-care unit(68, 69).  
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III. Epidemiology of MDROs 
Trends: Prevalence of MDROs varies temporally, geographically, and by healthcare 
setting(70, 71).  For example, VRE emerged in the eastern United States in the early 1990s, 
but did not appear in the western United States until several years later, and MDRSP varies 
in prevalence by state(72).  The type and level of care also influence the prevalence of 
MDROs.  ICUs, especially those at tertiary care facilities, may have a higher prevalence of 
MDRO infections than do non-ICU settings (73, 74). Antimicrobial resistance rates are also 
strongly correlated with hospital size, tertiary-level care, and facility type (e.g., LTCF)(75, 
76).  The frequency of clinical infection caused by these pathogens is low in LTCFs(77, 78).  
Nonetheless, MDRO infections in LTCFs can cause serious disease and mortality, and 
colonized or infected LTCF residents may serve as reservoirs and vehicles for MDRO 
introduction into acute care facilities (78-88).  Another example of population differences in 
prevalence of target MDROs is in the pediatric population. Point prevalence surveys 
conducted by the Pediatric Prevention Network (PPN) in eight U.S. PICUs and 7 U.S. 
NICUs in 2000 found < 4% of patients were colonized with MRSA or VRE compared with 
10-24% were colonized with ceftazidime- or aminoglycoside-resistant gram-negative bacilli; 
< 3% were colonized with ESBL-producing gram negative bacilli.  Despite some evidence 
that MDRO burden is greatest in adult hospital patients, MDRO require similar control efforts 
in pediatric populations as well(89). 
 
During the last several decades, the prevalence of MDROs in U.S. hospitals and medical 
centers has increased steadily(90, 91). MRSA was first isolated in the United States in 
1968. By the early 1990s, MRSA accounted for 20%-25% of Staphylococcus aureus 
isolates from hospitalized patients(92). In 1999, MRSA accounted for >50% of S. aureus 
isolates from patients in ICUs in the National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance (NNIS) 
system; in 2003, 59.5% of S. aureus isolates in NNIS ICUs were MRSA (93). A similar rise 
in prevalence has occurred with VRE (94). From 1990 to 1997, the prevalence of VRE in 
enterococcal isolates from hospitalized patients increased from <1% to approximately 15% 
(95). VRE accounted for almost 25% of enterococcus isolates in NNIS ICUs in 1999 (94), 
and 28.5% in 2003 (93). 
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GNB resistant to ESBLs, fluoroquinolones, carbapenems, and aminoglycosides also have 
increased in prevalence. For example, in 1997, the SENTRY Antimicrobial Surveillance 
Program found that among K. pneumoniae strains isolated in the United States,  resistance 
rates to ceftazidime and other third-generation cephalosporins were 6.6%, 9.7%, 5.4%, and 
3.6% for bloodstream, pneumonia, wound, and urinary tract infections, respectively (95) In 
2003, 20.6% of all K. pneumoniae isolates from NNIS ICUs were resistant to these drugs 
((93)). Similarly, between 1999 and 2003, Pseudomonas aeruginosa resistance to 
fluoroquinolone antibiotics increased from 23% to 29.5% in NNIS ICUs(74).  Also, a 3-month 
survey of 15 Brooklyn hospitals in 1999 found that 53% of A. baumannii strains exhibited 
resistance to carbapenems and 24% of P. aeruginosa strains were resistant to imipenem 
(10). During 1994-2000, a national review of ICU patients in 43 states found that the overall 
susceptibility to ciprofloxacin decreased from 86% to 76% and was temporally associated 
with increased use of fluoroquinolones in the United States (96). 
 
Lastly, an analysis of temporal trends of antimicrobial resistance in non-ICU patients in 23 
U.S. hospitals during 1996-1997 and 1998-1999 (97) found significant increases in the 
prevalence of resistant isolates including MRSA, ciprofloxacin-resistant P. aeruginosa, and 
ciprofloxacin- or ofloxacin-resistant E. coli. Several factors may have contributed to these 
increases including: selective pressure exerted by exposure to antimicrobial agents, 
particularly fluoroquinolones, outside of the ICU and/or in the community(7, 96, 98); 
increasing rates of community-associated MRSA colonization and infection(99, 100); 
inadequate adherence to infection control practices; or a combination of these factors.   
 
Important concepts in transmission.  Once MDROs are introduced into a healthcare 
setting, transmission and persistence of the resistant strain is determined by the availability 
of vulnerable patients, selective pressure exerted by antimicrobial use, increased potential 
for transmission from larger numbers of colonized or infected patients (“colonization 
pressure”)(101, 102); and the impact of implementation and adherence to prevention efforts. 
Patients vulnerable to colonization and infection include those with severe disease, 
especially those with compromised host defenses from underlying medical conditions; 
recent surgery; or indwelling medical devices (e.g., urinary catheters or endotracheal 
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tubes(103, 104)). Hospitalized patients, especially ICU patients, tend to have more risk 
factors than non-hospitalized patients do, and have the highest infection rates. For example, 
the risk that an ICU patient will acquire VRE increases significantly once the proportion of 
ICU patients colonized with VRE exceeds 50%(101) or the number days of exposure to a 
VRE-patient exceeds 15 days(105). A similar effect of colonization pressure has been 
demonstrated for MRSA in a medical ICU(102). Increasing numbers of infections with 
MDROs also have been reported in non-ICU areas of hospitals(97). 
 
There is ample epidemiologic evidence to suggest that MDROs are carried from one person 
to another via the hands of HCP(106-109).  Hands are easily contaminated during the 
process of care-giving or from contact with environmental surfaces in close proximity to the 
patient(110-113). The latter is especially important when patients have diarrhea and the 
reservoir of the MDRO is the gastrointestinal tract(114-117). Without adherence to 
published recommendations for hand hygiene and glove use(111) HCP are more likely to 
transmit MDROs to patients. Thus, strategies to increase and monitor adherence are 
important components of MDRO control programs(106, 118). 
 
Opportunities for transmission of MDROs beyond the acute care hospital results from 
patients receiving care at multiple healthcare facilities and moving between acute-care, 
ambulatory and/or chronic care, and LTC environments.  System-wide surveillance at LDS 
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, monitored patients identified as being infected or colonized 
with MRSA or VRE, and found that those patients subsequently received inpatient or 
outpatient care at as many as 62 different healthcare facilities in that system during a 5-year 
span(119). 
 
Role of colonized HCP in MDRO transmission. Rarely, HCP may introduce an MDRO 
into a patient care unit(120-123). Occasionally, HCP can become persistently colonized with 
an MDRO, but these HCP have a limited role in transmission, unless other factors are 
present. Additional factors that can facilitate transmission, include chronic sinusitis(120), 
upper respiratory infection(123), and dermatitis(124). 
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Implications of community-associated MRSA (CA-MRSA). The emergence of new 
epidemic strains of MRSA in the community, among patients without established MRSA risk 
factors, may present new challenges to MRSA control in healthcare settings(125-128).  
Historically, genetic analyses of MRSA isolated from patients in hospitals worldwide 
revealed that a relatively small number of MRSA strains have unique qualities that facilitate 
their transmission from patient to patient within healthcare facilities over wide geographic 
areas, explaining the dramatic increases in HAIs caused by MRSA in the 1980s and early 
1990s(129). To date, most MRSA strains isolated from patients with CA-MRSA infections 
have been microbiologically distinct from those endemic in healthcare settings, suggesting 
that some of these strains may have arisin de novo in the community via acquisition of 
methicillin resistance genes by established methicillin-susceptible S. aureus (MSSA) 
strains(130-132). Two pulsed-field types, termed USA300 and USA400 according to a 
typing scheme established at CDC, have accounted for the majority of CA-MRSA infections 
characterized in the United States, whereas pulsed-field types USA100 and USA200 are the 
predominant genotypes endemic in healthcare settings(133). 
 
USA300 and USA400 genotypes almost always carry type IV of the staphylococcal 
chromosomal cassette (SCC) mec, the mobile genetic element that carries the mecA 
methicillin-resistance gene (133, 134).  This genetic cassette is smaller than types I through 
III, the types typically found in healthcare associated MRSA strains, and is hypothesized to 
be more easily transferable between S. aureus strains. 
 
CA-MRSA infection presents most commonly as relatively minor skin and soft tissue 
infections, but severe invasive disease, including necrotizing pneumonia, necrotizing 
fasciitis, severe osteomyelitis,  and a sepsis syndrome with increased mortality have also 
been described in children and adults(134-136).  
 
Transmission within hospitals of MRSA strains first described in the community (e.g. 
USA300 and USA400) are being reported with increasing frequency(137-140).  Changing 
resistance patterns of MRSA in ICUs in the NNIS system from 1992 to 2003 provide 
additional evidence that the new epidemic MRSA strains are becoming established 
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healthcare-associated as well as community pathogens(90).  Infections with these strains 
have most commonly presented as skin disease in community settings.  However, intrinsic 
virulence characteristics of the organisms can result in clinical manifestations similar to or 
potentially more severe than traditional healthcare-associated MRSA infections among 
hospitalized patients.  The prevalence of MRSA colonization and infection in the 
surrounding community may therefore affect the selection of strategies for MRSA control in 
healthcare settings. 
 
IV. MDRO Prevention and Control  
Prevention of  Infections. Preventing infections will reduce the burden of MDROs in 
healthcare settings. Prevention of antimicrobial resistance depends on appropriate clinical 
practices that should be incorporated into all routine patient care. These include optimal 
management of vascular and urinary catheters, prevention of lower respiratory tract 
infection in intubated patients, accurate diagnosis of infectious etiologies, and judicious 
antimicrobial selection and utilization. Guidance for these preventive practices include the 
Campaign to Reduce Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings 
(www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/healthcare/default.htm), a multifaceted, evidence-based 
approach with four parallel strategies: infection prevention; accurate and prompt diagnosis 
and treatment; prudent use of antimicrobials; and prevention of transmission. Campaign 
materials are available for acute care hospitals, surgical settings, dialysis units, LTCFs and 
pediatric acute care units.  
 
To reduce rates of central-venous-line associated bloodstream infections(CVL-BSIs) and 
ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP), a group of bundled evidence-based clinical 
practices have been implemented in many U.S. healthcare facilities(118, 141-144). One 
report demonstrated a sustained effect on the reduction in CVL-BSI rates with this 
approach(145). Although the specific effect on MDRO infection and colonization rates have 
not been reported, it is logical that decreasing these and other healthcare-associated 
infections will in turn reduce antimicrobial use and decrease opportunities for emergence 
and transmission of MDROs.  
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Prevention and Control of MDRO transmission 
Overview of the MDRO control literature. Successful control of MDROs has been 
documented in the United States and abroad using a variety of combined interventions. 
These include improvements in hand hygiene, use of Contact Precautions until patients are 
culture-negative for a target MDRO, active surveillance cultures (ASC), education, 
enhanced environmental cleaning, and improvements in communication about patients with 
MDROs within and between healthcare facilities. 
Representative studies include:  
 Reduced rates of MRSA transmission in The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and other 
Scandinavian countries after the implementation of aggressive and sustained infection 
control interventions (i.e., ASC; preemptive use of Contact Precautions upon admission 
until proven culture negative; and, in some instances, closure of units to new 
admissions).  MRSA generally accounts for a very small proportion of S. aureus clinical 
isolates in these countries(146-150). 
 Reduced rates of VRE transmission in healthcare facilities in the three-state Siouxland 
region (Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota) following formation of a coalition and 
development of an effective region-wide infection control intervention that included ASC 
and isolation of infected patients. The overall prevalence rate of VRE in the 30 
participating facilities decreased from 2.2% in 1997 to 0.5% in 1999(151). 
 Eradication of endemic MRSA infections from two NICUs. The first NICU included 
implementation of ASC, Contact Precautions, use of triple dye on the umbilical cord, and 
systems changes to improve surveillance and adherence to recommended practices and 
to reduce overcrowding(152). The second NICU used ASC and Contact  Precautions; 
surgical masks were included in the barriers used for Contact Precautions(153). 
 Control of an outbreak and eventual eradication of VRE from a burn unit over a 13-
month period with implementation of aggressive culturing, environmental cleaning, and 
barrier isolation(154). 
 Control of an outbreak of VRE in a NICU over a 3-year period with implementation of 
ASC, other infection control measures such as use of a waterless hand disinfectant, and 
mandatory in-service education(155). 
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 Eradication of MDR-strains of A. baumannii from a burn unit over a 16-month period with 
implementation of strategies to improve adherence to hand hygiene, isolation, 
environmental cleaning, and temporary unit closure(38). 
 In addition, more than 100 reports published during 1982-2005 support the efficacy of 
combinations of various control interventions to reduce the burden of MRSA, VRE, and 
MDR-GNBs (Tables 1 and 2). Case-rate reduction or pathogen eradication was reported 
in a majority of studies.  
  VRE was eradicated in seven special-care units(154, 156-160), two hospitals(161, 162), 
and one LTCF(163). 
 MRSA was eradicated from nine special-care units(89, 152, 153, 164-169), two 
hospitals(170), one LTCF(167), and one Finnish district(171).  Furthermore, four MRSA 
reports described continuing success in sustaining low endemic MDRO rates for over 5 
years(68, 166, 172, 173). 
 An MDR-GNB was eradicated from 13 special-care units(8, 9, 38, 174-180) and two 
hospitals (11, 181).  
These success stories testify to the importance of having dedicated and knowledgeable 
teams of healthcare professionals who are willing to persist for years, if necessary, to 
control MDROs. Eradication and control of MDROs, such as those reported, frequently 
required periodic reassessment and the addition of new and more stringent interventions 
over time (tiered strategy).  For example, interventions were added in a stepwise fashion 
during a 3-year effort that eventually eradicated MRSA from an NICU(152). A series of 
interventions was adopted throughout the course of a year to eradicate VRE from a burn 
unit(154). Similarly, eradication of carbapenem-resistant strains of A. baumannii from a 
hospital required multiple and progressively more intense interventions over several 
years(11). 
 
Nearly all studies reporting successful MDRO control employed a median of 7 to 8 different 
interventions concurrently or sequentially (Table 1). These figures may underestimate the 
actual number of control measures used, because authors of these reports may have 
considered their earliest efforts routine (e.g., added emphasis on handwashing), and did not 
include them as interventions, and some ”single measures” are, in fact, a complex 
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combination of several interventions. The use of multiple concurrent control measures in 
these reports underscores the need for a comprehensive approach for controlling MDROs.  
 
Several factors affect the ability to generalize the results of the various studies reviewed, 
including differences in definition, study design, endpoints and variables measured, and 
period of follow-up. Two-thirds of the reports cited in Tables 1 and 2 involved perceived 
outbreaks, and one-third described efforts to reduce endemic transmission. Few reports 
described preemptive efforts or prospective studies to control MDROs before they had 
reached high levels within a unit or facility.  
 
With these and other factors, it has not been possible to determine the effectiveness of 
individual interventions, or a specific combination of interventions, that would be appropriate 
for all healthcare facilities to implement in order to control their target MDROs. Randomized 
controlled trials are necessary to acquire this level of evidence. An NIH-sponsored, 
randomized controlled trial on the prevention of MRSA and VRE transmission in adult ICUs 
is ongoing and may provide further insight into optimal control measures 
(http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct/show/NCT00100386?order=1). This trial compares the use of 
education (to improve adherence to hand hygiene) and Standard Precautions to the use of 
ASC and Contact Precautions.  
 
Control Interventions. The various types of interventions used to control or eradicate 
MDROs may be grouped into seven categories. These include administrative support, 
judicious use of antimicrobials, surveillance (routine and enhanced), Standard and Contact 
Precautions, environmental measures, education and decolonization. These interventions 
provide the basis for the recommendations for control of MDROs in healthcare settings that 
follow this review and as summarized in Table 3. In the studies reviewed, these 
interventions were applied in various combinations and degrees of intensity, with differences 
in outcome.  
1. Administrative support. In several reports, administrative support and involvement 
were important for the successful control of the target MDRO(3, 152, 182-185), and 
authorities in infection control have strongly recommended such support(2, 106, 107, 
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186). There are several examples of MDRO control interventions that require 
administrative commitment of fiscal and human resources. One is the use of ASC(8, 
38, 68, 107, 114, 151, 152, 167, 168, 183, 184, 187-192).  Other interventions that 
require administrative support include: 1)  implementing system changes to ensure 
prompt and effective communications e.g., computer alerts to identify patients 
previously known to be colonized/infected with MDROs(184, 189, 193, 194); 2), 
providing the necessary number and appropriate placement of hand washing sinks 
and alcohol-containing hand rub dispensers in the facility(106, 195); 3) maintaining 
staffing levels appropriate to the intensity of care required(152, 196-202); and 4) 
enforcing adherence to recommended infection control practices (e.g., hand hygiene, 
Standard and Contact Precautions) for MDRO control. Other measures that have 
been associated with a positive impact on prevention efforts, that require 
administrative support, are direct observation with feedback to HCP on adherence to 
recommended precautions and keeping HCP informed about changes in 
transmission rates(3, 152, 182, 203-205).  A “How-to guide” for implementing change 
in ICUs, including analysis of structure, process, and outcomes when designing 
interventions, can assist in identification of needed administrative interventions(195).  
Lastly, participation  in existing, or the creation of new, city-wide, state-wide, regional 
or national coalitions, to combat emerging or growing MDRO problems is an effective 
strategy that requires administrative support(146, 151, 167, 188, 206, 207). 
 
2. Education.  Facility-wide, unit-targeted, and informal, educational interventions were 
included in several successful studies(3, 189, 193, 208-211). The focus of the 
interventions was to encourage a behavior change through improved understanding 
of the problem MDRO that the facility was trying to control. Whether the desired 
change involved hand hygiene, antimicrobial prescribing patterns, or other outcomes, 
enhancing understanding and creating a culture that supported and promoted the 
desired behavior, were viewed as essential to the success of the intervention. 
Educational campaigns to enhance adherence to hand hygiene practices in 
conjunction with other control measures have been associated temporally with 
decreases in MDRO transmission in various healthcare settings(3, 106, 163). 
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3. Judicious use of antimicrobial agents. While a comprehensive review of 
antimicrobial stewardship is beyond the scope of this guideline, recommendations for 
control of MDROs must include attention to judicious antimicrobial use.  A temporal 
association between formulary changes and decreased occurrence of a target MDRO 
was found in several studies, especially in those that focused on MDR-GNBs(98, 
177, 209, 212-218).  Occurrence of C. difficile-associated disease has also been 
associated with changes in antimicrobial use(219).  Although some MRSA and VRE 
control efforts have attempted to limit antimicrobial use, the relative importance of this 
measure for controlling these MDROs remains unclear(193, 220). Limiting 
antimicrobial use alone may fail to control resistance due to a combination of factors; 
including 1) the relative effect of antimicrobials on providing initial selective pressure, 
compared to perpetuating resistance once it has emerged; 2) inadequate limits on 
usage; or 3) insufficient time to observe the impact of this intervention. With the intent 
of  addressing  #2 and #3 above in the study design, one study demonstrated a 
decrease in the prevalence of VRE associated with a formulary switch from ticarcillin-
clavulanate to piperacillin-tazobactam(221).  
 
The CDC Campaign to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance that was launched in 2002 
provides evidence-based principles for judicious use of antimicrobials and tools for 
implementation(222) www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/healthcare. This effort targets all 
healthcare settings and focuses on effective antimicrobial treatment of infections, use 
of narrow spectrum agents, treatment of infections and not contaminants, avoiding 
excessive duration of therapy, and restricting use of broad-spectrum or more potent 
antimicrobials to treatment of serious infections when the pathogen is not known or 
when other effective agents are unavailable. Achieving these objectives would likely 
diminish the selective pressure that favors proliferation of MDROs. Strategies for 
influencing antimicrobial prescribing patterns within healthcare facilities include 
education; formulary restriction; prior-approval programs, including pre-approved 
indications; automatic stop orders; academic interventions to counteract 
pharmaceutical influences on prescribing patterns; antimicrobial cycling(223-226); 
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computer-assisted management programs(227-229); and active efforts to remove 
redundant antimicrobial combinations(230).  A systematic review of controlled studies 
identified several successful practices. These include social marketing (i.e. consumer 
education), practice guidelines, authorization systems, formulary restriction, 
mandatory consultation, and peer review and feedback. It further suggested that 
online systems that provide clinical information, structured order entry, and decision 
support are promising strategies(231). These changes are best accomplished 
through an organizational, multidisciplinary, antimicrobial management program(232). 
 
4. MDRO surveillance. Surveillance is a critically important component of any MDRO 
control program, allowing detection of newly emerging pathogens, monitoring 
epidemiologic trends, and measuring the effectiveness of interventions. Multiple 
MDRO surveillance strategies have been employed, ranging from surveillance of 
clinical microbiology laboratory results obtained as part of routine clinical care, to use 
of ASC to detect asymptomatic colonization.  
 
Surveillance for MDROs isolated from routine clinical cultures.  
Antibiograms. The simplest form of MDRO surveillance is monitoring of clinical 
microbiology isolates resulting from tests ordered as part of routine clinical care. This 
method is particularly useful to detect emergence of new MDROs not previously 
detected, either within an individual healthcare facility or community-wide. In addition, 
this information can be used to prepare facility- or unit-specific summary antimicrobial 
susceptibility reports that describe pathogen-specific prevalence of resistance among 
clinical isolates. Such reports may be useful to monitor for changes in known 
resistance patterns that might signal emergence or transmission of MDROs, and also 
to provide clinicians with information to guide antimicrobial prescribing practices(233-
235). 
 
MDRO Incidence Based on Clinical Culture Results. Some investigators have 
used clinical microbiology results to calculate measures of incidence of MDRO 
isolates in specific populations or patient care locations (e.g. new MDRO 
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isolates/1,000 patient days, new MDRO isolates per month)(205, 236, 237).  Such 
measures may be useful for monitoring MDRO trends and assessing the impact of 
prevention programs, although they have limitations. Because they are based solely 
on positive culture results without accompanying clinical information, they do not 
distinguish colonization from infection, and may not fully demonstrate the burden of 
MDRO-associated disease. Furthermore, these measures do not precisely measure 
acquisition of MDRO colonization in a given populaton or location. Isolating an 
MDRO from a clinical culture obtained from a patient several days after admission to 
a given unit or facility does not establish that the patient acquired colonization in that 
unit. On the other hand, patients who acquire MDRO colonization may remain 
undetected by clinical cultures(107).  Despite these limitations, incidence measures 
based on clinical culture results may be highly correlated with actual MDRO 
transmission rates derived from information using ASC, as demonstrated in a recent 
multicenter study(237).  These results suggest that incidence measures based on 
clinical cultures alone might be useful surrogates for monitoring changes in MDRO 
transmission rates.  
 
MDRO Infection Rates. Clinical cultures can also be used to identify targeted MDRO 
infections in certain patient populations or units(238, 239).  This strategy requires 
investigation of clinical circumstances surrounding a positive culture to distinguish 
colonization from infection, but it can be particularly helpful in defining the clinical 
impact of MDROs within a facility. 
 
Molecular typing of MDRO isolates. Many investigators have used molecular 
typing of selected isolates to confirm clonal transmission to enhance understanding 
of MDRO transmission and the effect of interventions within their facility(38, 68, 89, 
92, 138, 152, 190, 193, 236, 240). 
 
Surveillance for MDROs by Detecting Asymptomatic Colonization  
Another form of MDRO surveillance is the use of active surveillance cultures (ASC) to 
identify patients who are colonized with a targeted MDRO(38, 107, 241). This 
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approach is based upon the observation that, for some MDROs, detection of 
colonization may be delayed or missed completely if culture results obtained in the 
course of routine clinical care are the primary means of identifying colonized 
patients(8, 38, 107, 114, 151, 153, 167, 168, 183, 184, 187, 189, 191-193, 242-244).  
Several authors report having used ASC when new pathogens emerge in order to 
define the epidemiology of the particular agent(22, 23, 107, 190).  In addition, the 
authors of several reports have concluded that ASC, in combination with use of 
Contact Precautions for colonized patients, contributed directly to the decline or 
eradication of the target MDRO(38, 68, 107, 151, 153, 184, 217, 242).  However, not 
all studies have reached the same conclusion.  Poor control of MRSA despite use of 
ASC has been described(245).  A recent study failed to identify cross-transmission of 
MRSA or MSSA in a MICU during a 10 week period when ASC were obtained, 
despite the fact that culture results were not reported to the staff(246). The 
investigators suggest that the degree of cohorting and adherence to Standard 
Precautions might have been the important determinants of transmission prevention, 
rather than the use of ASC and Contact Precautions for MRSA-colonized patients. 
The authors of a systematic review of the literature on the use of isolation measures 
to control healthcare-associated MRSA concluded that there is evidence that 
concerted efforts that include ASC and isolation can reduce MRSA even in endemic 
settings. However, the authors also noted that methodological weaknesses and 
inadequate reporting in published research make it difficult to rule out plausible 
alternative explanations for reductions in MRSA acquisition associated with these 
interventions, and therefore concluded that the precise contribution of active 
surveillance and isolation alone is difficult to assess(247). 
 
Mathematical modeling studies have been used to estimate the impact of ASC use in 
control of MDROs. One such study evaluating interventions to decrease VRE 
transmission indicated that use of ASC (versus no cultures) could potentially 
decrease transmission 39% and that with pre-emptive isolation plus ASC, 
transmission could be decreased 65%(248).  Another mathematical model examining 
the use of ASC and isolation for control of MRSA predicted that isolating colonized or 
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infected patients on the basis of clinical culture results is unlikely to be successful at 
controlling MRSA, whereas use of active surveillance and isolation can lead to 
successful control, even in settings where MRSA is highly endemic.(249)  There is 
less literature on the use of ASC in controlling MDR-GNBs. Active surveillance 
cultures have been used as part of efforts to successful control of MDR-GNBs in 
outbreak settings.  The experience with ASC as part of successful control efforts in 
endemic settings is mixed. One study reported successful reduction of extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase –producing Enterobacteriaceae over a six year period 
using a multifaceted control program that included use of ASC(245).  Other reports 
suggest that use of ASC is not necessary to control endemic MDR-GNBs.(250, 251).   
 
More research is needed to determine the circumstances under which ASC are most 
beneficial(252), but their use should be considered in some settings, especially if 
other control measures have been ineffective. When use of ASC is incorporated into 
MDRO prevention programs, the following should be considered: 
• The decision to use ASC as part of an infection prevention and control program 
requires additional support for successful implementation, including: 1) personnel 
to obtain the appropriate cultures, 2) microbiology laboratory personnel to process 
the cultures, 3) mechanism for communicating results to caregivers, 4) concurrent 
decisions about use of additional isolation measures triggered by a positive 
culture (e.g. Contact Precautions) and 5) mechanism for assuring adherence to 
the additional isolation measures. 
• The populations targeted for ASC are not well defined and vary among published 
reports.  Some investigators have chosen to target specific patient populations 
considered at high risk for MDRO colonization based on factors such as location 
(e.g. ICU with high MDRO rates), antibiotic exposure history, presence of 
underlying diseases, prolonged duration of stay, exposure to other MDRO-
colonized patients, patients transferred from other facilities known to have a high 
prevalence of MDRO carriage, or having a history of recent hospital or nursing 
home stays(107, 151, 253).  A more commonly employed strategy involves 
obtaining surveillance cultures from all patients admitted to units experiencing 
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high rates of colonization/infection with the MDROs of interest, unless they are 
already known to be MDRO carriers(153, 184, 242, 254).  In an effort to better 
define target populations for active surveillance, investigators have attempted to 
create prediction rules to identify subpopulations of patients at high risk for 
colonization on hospital admission(255, 256).  Decisions about which populations 
should be targeted for active surveillance should be made in the context of local 
determinations of the incidence and prevalence of MDRO colonization within the 
intervention facility as well as other facilities with whom patients are frequently 
exchanged(257). 
• Optimal timing and interval of ASC are not well defined. In many reports, cultures 
were obtained at the time of admission to the hospital or intervention unit or at the 
time of transfer to or from designated units (e.g., ICU)(107). In addition, some 
hospitals have chosen to obtain cultures on a periodic basis [e.g., weekly(8, 153, 
159) to detect silent transmission. Others have based follow-up cultures on the 
presence of certain risk factors for MDRO colonization, such as antibiotic 
exposure, exposure to other MDRO colonized patients, or prolonged duration of 
stay in a high risk unit(253). 
• Methods for obtaining ASC must be carefully considered, and may vary 
depending upon the MDRO of interest.  
o MRSA: Studies suggest that cultures of the nares identify most patients 
with MRSA and perirectal and wound cultures can identify additional 
carriers(152, 258-261). 
o VRE: Stool, rectal, or perirectal swabs are generally considered a sensitive 
method for detection of VRE. While one study suggested that rectal swabs 
may identify only 60% of individuals harboring VRE, and may be affected 
by VRE stool density(262), this observation has not been reported 
elsewhere in the literature.  
o MDR-GNBs: Several methods for detection of MDR-GNBs have been 
employed, including use of peri-rectal or rectal swabs alone or in 
combination with oro-pharyngeal, endotracheal, inguinal, or wound 
cultures. The absence of standardized screening media for many gram-
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negative bacilli can make the process of isolating a specific MDR-GNB a 
relatively labor-intensive process(38, 190, 241, 250). 
o Rapid detection methods: Using conventional culture methods for active 
surveillance can result in a delay of 2-3 days before results are available. If 
the infection control precautions (e.g., Contact Precautions) are withheld 
until the results are available, the desired infection control measures could 
be delayed. If empiric precautions are used pending negative surveillance 
culture results, precautions may be unnecessarily implemented for many, if 
not most, patients. For this reason, investigators have sought methods for 
decreasing the time necessary to obtain a result from ASC. Commercially 
available media containing chromogenic enzyme substrates (CHROMagar 
MRSA(263, 264) has been shown to have high sensitivity and specificity 
for identification of MRSA and facilitate detection of MRSA colonies in 
screening cultures as early as 16 hours after inoculation. In addition, real-
time PCR-based tests for rapid detection of MRSA directly from culture 
swabs (< 1-2 hours) are now commercially available(265-267), as well as 
PCR-based tests for detection of vanA and van B genes from rectal 
swabs(268). The impact of rapid testing on the effectiveness of active 
surveillance as a prevention strategy, however, has not been fully 
determined. Rapid identification of MRSA in one study was associated with 
a significant reduction in MRSA infections acquired in the medical ICU, but 
not the surgical ICU(265).  A mathematical model characterizing MRSA 
transmission dynamics predicted that, in comparison to conventional 
culture methods, the use of rapid detection tests may decrease isolation 
needs in settings of low-endemicity and result in more rapid reduction in 
prevalence in highly-endemic settings(249). 
• Some MDRO control reports described surveillance cultures of healthcare 
personnel during outbreaks, but colonized or infected healthcare personnel are 
rarely the source of ongoing transmission, and this strategy should be reserved 
for settings in which specific healthcare personnel have been epidemiologically 
implicated in the transmission of MDROs(38, 92, 152-154, 188). 
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5. Infection Control Precautions.  Since 1996 CDC has recommended the use of 
Standard and Contact Precautions for MDROs “judged by an infection control 
program…to be of special clinical and epidemiologic significance.” This 
recommendation was based on general consensus and was not necessarily 
evidence-based. No studies have directly compared the efficacy of Standard 
Precautions alone versus Standard Precautions and Contact Precautions, with or 
without ASC, for control of MDROs. Some reports mention the use of one or both 
sets of precautions as part of successful MDRO control efforts; however, the 
precautions were not the primary focus of the study intervention(164, 190, 205, 269-
271).  The NIH-sponsored study mentioned earlier (Section: Overview of the MDRO 
control literature) may provide some answers, 
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct/show/NCT00100386?order=1).  
 
Standard Precautions have an essential role in preventing MDRO transmission, 
even in facilities that use Contact Precautions for patients with an identified MDRO. 
Colonization with MDROs is frequently undetected; even surveillance cultures may 
fail to identify colonized persons due to lack of sensitivity, laboratory deficiencies, or 
intermittent colonization due to antimicrobial therapy(262). Therefore, Standard 
Precautions must be used in order to prevent transmission from potentially colonized 
patients. Hand hygiene is an important component of Standard Precautions. The 
authors of the Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Healthcare Settings(106) cited nine 
studies that demonstrated a temporal relationship between improved adherence to 
recommended hand hygiene practices and control of MDROs. It is noteworthy that in 
one report the frequency of hand hygiene did not improve with use of Contact 
Precautions but did improve when gloves were used (per Standard Precautions) for 
contact with MDRO patients(272). 
 
MDRO control efforts frequently involved changes in isolation practices, especially 
during outbreaks. In the majority of reports, Contact Precautions were implemented 
for all patients found to be colonized or infected with the target MDRO (See Table 2). 
 24
Some facilities also preemptively used Contact Precautions, in conjunction with ASC, 
for all new admissions or for all patients admitted to a specific unit, until a negative 
screening culture for the target MDRO was reported(30, 184, 273).  
 
Contact Precautions are intended to prevent transmission of infectious agents, 
including epidemiologically important microorganisms, which are transmitted by direct 
or indirect contact with the patient or the patient’s environment. A single-patient room 
is preferred for patients who require Contact Precautions. When a single-patient 
room is not available, consultation with infection control is necessary to assess the 
various risks associated with other patient placement options (e.g., cohorting, 
keeping the patient with an existing roommate).  HCP caring for patients on Contact 
Precautions should wear a gown and gloves for all interactions that may involve 
contact with the patient or potentially contaminated areas in the patient’s 
environment. Donning gown and gloves upon room entry and discarding before 
exiting the patient room is done to contain pathogens, especially those that have 
been implicated in transmission through environmental contamination (e.g., VRE, C. 
difficile, noroviruses and other intestinal tract agents; RSV)(109, 111, 274-277). 
Cohorting and other MDRO control strategies. In several reports, cohorting of 
patients(152, 153, 167, 183, 184, 188, 189, 217, 242), cohorting of staff(184, 217, 
242, 278), use of designated beds or units(183, 184), and even unit closure(38, 146, 
159, 161, 279, 280) were necessary to control transmission. Some authors indicated 
that implementation of the latter two strategies were the turning points in their control 
efforts; however, these measures usually followed many other actions to prevent 
transmission. In one, two-center study, moving MRSA-positive patients into single 
rooms or cohorting these patients in designated bays failed to reduce transmission in 
ICUs. However, in this study adherence to recommendations for hand hygiene 
between patient contacts was only 21%(281). Other published studies, including one 
commissioned by the American Institute of Architects and the Facility Guidelines 
Institute (www.aia.org/aah_gd_hospcons), have documented a beneficial relationship 
between private rooms and reduction in risk of acquiring MDROs(282). Additional 
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studies are needed to define the specific contribution of using single-patient rooms 
and/or cohorting on preventing transmission of MDROs.   
 
Duration of Contact Precautions. The necessary duration of Contact Precautions 
for patients treated for infection with an MDRO, but who may continue to be 
colonized with the organism at one or more body sites, remains an unresolved issue. 
Patients may remain colonized with MDROs for prolonged periods; shedding of these 
organisms may be intermittent, and surveillance cultures may fail to detect their 
presence(84, 250, 283).  The 1995 HICPAC guideline for preventing the transmission 
of VRE suggested three negative stool/perianal cultures obtained at weekly intervals 
as a criterion for discontinuation of Contact Precautions(274).  One study found these 
criteria generally reliable(284).  However, this and other studies have noted a 
recurrence of VRE positive cultures in persons who subsequently receive 
antimicrobial therapy and persistent or intermittent carriage of VRE for more than 1 
year has been reported(284-286).  Similarly, colonization with MRSA can be 
prolonged(287, 288). Studies demonstrating initial clearance of MRSA following 
decolonization therapy have reported a high frequency of subsequent carriage(289, 
290).  There is a paucity of information in the literature on when to discontinue 
Contact Precautions for patients colonized with a MDR-GNB, possibly because 
infection and colonization with these MDROs are often associated with outbreaks. 
Despite the uncertainty about when to discontinue Contact Precautions, the studies 
offer some guidance. In the context of an outbreak, prudence would dictate that 
Contact Precautions be used indefinitely for all previously infected and known 
colonized patients. Likewise, if ASC are used to detect and isolate patients colonized 
with MRSA or VRE, and there is no decolonization of these patients, it is logical to 
assume that Contact Precautions would be used for the duration of stay in the setting 
where they were first implemented. In general, it seems reasonable to discontinue 
Contact Precautions when three or more surveillance cultures for the target MDRO 
are repeatedly negative over the course of a week or two in a patient who has not 
received antimicrobial therapy for several weeks, especially in the absence of a 
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draining wound, profuse respiratory secretions, or evidence implicating the specific 
patient in ongoing transmission of the MDRO within the facility.  
 
Barriers used for contact with patients infected or colonized with MDROs.  
Three studies evaluated the use of gloves with or without gowns for all patient 
contacts to prevent VRE acquisition in ICU settings(30, 105, 273). Two of the studies 
showed that use of both gloves and gowns reduced VRE transmission(30, 105) while 
the third showed no difference in transmission based on the barriers used(273). One 
study in a LTCF compared the use of gloves only, with gloves plus contact isolation, 
for patients with four MDROs, including VRE and MRSA, and found no 
difference(86). However, patients on contact isolation were more likely to acquire 
MDR-K. pneumoniae strains that were prevalent in the facility; reasons for this were 
not specifically known. In addition to differences in outcome, differing methodologies 
make comparisons difficult. Specifically, HCP adherence to the recommended 
protocol, the influence of added precautions on the number of HCP-patient 
interactions, and colonization pressure were not consistently assessed.  
 
Impact of Contact Precautions on patient care and well-being. There are limited 
data regarding the impact of Contact Precautions on patients. Two studies found that 
HCP, including attending physicians, were half as likely to enter the rooms of(291), or 
examine(292), patients on Contact Precautions. Other investigators have reported 
similar observations on surgical wards(293). Two studies reported that patients in 
private rooms and on barrier precautions for an MDRO had increased anxiety and 
depression scores(294, 295). Another study found that patients placed on Contact 
Precautions for MRSA had significantly more preventable adverse events, expressed 
greater dissatisfaction with their treatment, and had less documented care than 
control patients who were not in isolation(296). Therefore, when patients are placed 
on Contact Precautions, efforts must be made by the healthcare team to counteract 
these potential adverse effects. 
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6. Environmental measures. The potential role of environmental reservoirs, such as 
surfaces and medical equipment, in the transmission of VRE and other MDROs has 
been the subject of several reports(109-111, 297, 298). While environmental cultures 
are not routinely recommended(299), environmental cultures were used in several 
studies to document contamination, and led to interventions that included the use of 
dedicated noncritical medical equipment(217, 300), assignment of dedicated cleaning 
personnel to the affected patient care unit(154), and increased cleaning and 
disinfection of frequently-touched surfaces (e.g., bedrails, charts, bedside 
commodes, doorknobs).  A common reason given for finding environmental 
contamination with an MDRO was the lack of adherence to facility procedures for 
cleaning and disinfection. In an educational and observational intervention, which 
targeted a defined group of housekeeping personnel, there was a persistent 
decrease in the acquisition of VRE in a medical ICU(301). Therefore, monitoring for 
adherence to recommended environmental cleaning practices is an important 
determinant for success in controlling transmission of MDROs and other pathogens 
in the environment(274, 302). 
 
In the MDRO reports reviewed, enhanced environmental cleaning was frequently 
undertaken when there was evidence of environmental contamination and ongoing 
transmission. Rarely, control of the target MDRO required vacating a patient care unit 
for complete environmental cleaning and assessment(175, 279). 
 
7. Decolonization.  Decolonization entails treatment of persons colonized with a 
specific MDRO, usually MRSA, to eradicate carriage of that organism. Although 
some investigators have attempted to decolonize patients harboring VRE(220), few 
have achieved success. However, decolonization of persons carrying MRSA in their 
nares has proved possible with several regimens that include topical mupirocin alone 
or in combination with orally administered antibiotics (e.g., rifampin in combination 
with trimethoprim- sulfamethoxazole or ciprofloxacin) plus the use of an antimicrobial 
soap for bathing(303).  In one report, a 3-day regimen of baths with povidone-iodine 
and nasal therapy with mupirocin resulted in eradication of nasal MRSA 
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colonization(304).  These and other methods of MRSA decolonization have been 
thoroughly  reviewed.(303, 305-307). 
 
Decolonization regimens are not sufficiently effective to warrant routine use. 
Therefore, most healthcare facilities have limited the use of decolonization to MRSA 
outbreaks, or other high prevalence situations, especially those affecting special-care 
units. Several factors limit the utility of this control measure on a widespread basis: 1) 
identification of candidates for decolonization requires surveillance cultures; 2) 
candidates receiving decolonization treatment must receive follow-up cultures to 
ensure eradication; and 3) recolonization with the same strain, initial colonization with 
a mupirocin-resistant strain, and emergence of resistance to mupirocin during 
treatment can occur(289, 303, 308-310).  HCP implicated in transmission of MRSA 
are candidates for decolonization and should be treated and culture negative before 
returning to direct patient care. In contrast, HCP who are colonized with MRSA, but 
are asymptomatic, and have not been linked epidemiologically to transmission, do 
not require decolonization.  
 
IV. Discussion 
This review demonstrates the depth of published science on the prevention and control of 
MDROs. Using a combination of interventions, MDROs in endemic, outbreak, and non-
endemic settings have been brought under control. However, despite the volume of 
literature, an appropriate set of evidence-based control measures that can be universally 
applied in all healthcare settings has not been definitively established. This is due in part to 
differences in study methodology and outcome measures, including an absence of 
randomized, controlled trials comparing one MDRO control measure or strategy with 
another. Additionally, the data are largely descriptive and quasi-experimental in 
design(311). Few reports described preemptive efforts or prospective studies to control 
MDROs before they had reached high levels within a unit or facility. Furthermore, small 
hospitals and LTCFs are infrequently represented in the literature. 
A number of questions remain and are discussed below. 
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Impact on other MDROS from interventions targeted to one MDRO Only one report 
described control efforts directed at more than one MDRO, i.e., MDR-GNB and MRSA(312).  
Several reports have shown either decreases or increases in other pathogens with efforts to 
control one MDRO. For example, two reports on VRE control efforts demonstrated an 
increase in MRSA following the prioritization of VRE patients to private rooms and cohort 
beds(161).  Similarly an outbreak of Serratia marcescens was temporally associated with a 
concurrent, but unrelated, outbreak of MRSA in an NICU(313). In contrast, Wright and 
colleagues reported a decrease in MRSA and VRE acquisition in an ICU during and after 
their successful effort to eradicate an MDR-strain of A. baumannii from the unit(210).   
 
Colonization with multiple MDROs appears to be common(314, 315).  One study found that 
nearly 50% of residents in a skilled-care unit in a LTCF were colonized with a target MDRO 
and that 26% were co-colonized with >1 MDRO; a detailed analysis showed that risk factors 
for colonization varied by pathogen(316).  One review of the literature(317)  reported that 
patient risk factors associated with colonization with MRSA, VRE, MDR-GNB, C. difficile and 
Candida sp were the same. This review concluded that control programs that focus on only 
one organism or one antimicrobial drug are unlikely to succeed because vulnerable patients 
will continue to serve as a magnet for other MDROs.  
 
Costs. Several authors have provided evidence for the cost-effectiveness of approaches 
that use ASC(153, 191, 253, 318, 319).  However, the supportive evidence often relied on 
assumptions, projections, and estimated attributable costs of MDRO infections. Similar 
limitations apply to a study suggesting that gown use yields a cost benefit in controlling 
transmission of VRE in ICUs(320). To date, no studies have directly compared the benefits 
and costs associated with different MDRO control strategies. 
 
Feasibility.  The subject of feasibility, as it applies to the extrapolation of results to other 
healthcare settings, has not been addressed.  For example, smaller hospitals and LTCFs 
may lack the on-site laboratory services needed to obtain ASC in a timely manner. This 
factor could limit the applicability of an aggressive program based on obtaining ASC and 
preemptive placement of patients on Contact Precautions in these settings. However, with 
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the growing problem of antimicrobial resistance, and the recognized role of all healthcare 
settings for control of this problem, it is imperative that appropriate human and fiscal 
resources be invested to increase the feasibility of recommended control strategies in every 
setting. 
 
Factors that influence selection of MDRO control measures. Although some common  
principles apply, the preceding literature review indicates that no single approach to the 
control of MDROs is appropriate for all healthcare facilities. Many factors influence the 
choice of interventions to be applied within an institution, including: 
 
• Type and significance of problem MDROs within the institution. Many 
facilities have an MRSA problem while others have ESBL-producing K. 
pneumoniae. Some facilities have no VRE colonization or disease; others have 
high rates of VRE colonization without disease; and still others have ongoing VRE 
outbreaks. The magnitude of the problem also varies. Healthcare facilities may 
have very low numbers of cases, e.g., with a newly introduced strain, or may have 
prolonged, extensive outbreaks or colonization in the population. Between these 
extremes, facilities may have low or high levels of endemic colonization and 
variable levels of infection.  
 
• Population and healthcare-settings.  The presence of high-risk patients (e.g., 
transplant, hematopoietic stem-cell transplant) and special-care units (e.g. adult, 
pediatric, and neonatal ICUs; burn; hemodialysis) will influence surveillance 
needs and could limit the areas of a facility targeted for MDRO control 
interventions. Although it appears that MDRO transmission seldom occurs in 
ambulatory and outpatient settings, some patient populations (e.g., hemodialysis, 
cystic fibrosis) and patients receiving chemotherapeutic agents are at risk for 
colonization and infection with MDROs. Furthermore, the emergence of VRSA 
within the outpatient setting(22, 23, 25) demonstrates that even these settings 
need to make MDRO prevention a priority. 
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Differences of opinion on the optimal strategy to control MDROs. Published guidance 
on the control of MDROs reflects areas of ongoing debate on optimal control strategies. A 
key issue is the use of ASC in control efforts and preemptive use of Contact Precautions 
pending negative surveillance culture results(107, 321, 322).  The various guidelines 
currently available exhibit a spectrum of approaches, which their authors deem to be 
evidence-based. One guideline for control of MRSA and VRE, the Society for Healthcare 
Epidemiology of America (SHEA) guideline from 2003(107), emphasizes routine use of ASC 
and Contact Precautions.  That position paper does not address control of MDR-GNBs. The 
salient features of SHEA recommendations for MRSA and VRE control and the 
recommendations in this guideline for control of MDROs, including MRSA and VRE, have 
been compared(323); recommended interventions are similar.  Other guidelines for VRE 
and MRSA, e.g., those proffered by the Michigan Society for Infection Control  (www.msic-
online.org/resource_sections/aro_guidelines), emphasize consistent practice of Standard 
Precautions and tailoring the use of ASC and Contact Precautions to local conditions, the 
specific MDROs that are prevalent and being transmitted, and the presence of risk factors 
for transmission.  A variety of approaches have reduced MDRO rates(3, 164, 165, 209, 214, 
240, 269, 324).  Therefore, selection of interventions for controlling MDRO transmission 
should be based on assessments of the local problem, the prevalence of various MDRO 
and feasibility.  Individual facilities should seek appropriate guidance and adopt effective 
measures that fit their circumstances and needs.  Most studies have been in acute care 
settings; for non-acute care settings (e.g., LCTF, small rural hospitals), the optimal approach 
is not well defined.  
 
Two-Tiered Approach for Control of MDROs. Reports describing successful 
control of MDRO transmission in healthcare facilities have included seven categories of 
interventions (Table 3). As a rule, these reports indicate that facilities confronted with an 
MDRO problem selected a combination of control measures, implemented them, and 
reassessed their impact. In some cases, new measures were added serially to further 
enhance control efforts. This evidence indicates that the control of MDROs is a dynamic 
process that requires a systematic approach tailored to the problem and healthcare setting. 
The nature of this evidence gave rise to the two-tiered approach to MDRO control 
 32
recommended in this guideline.  This approach provides the flexibility needed to prevent 
and control MDRO transmission in every kind of facility addressed by this guideline. 
Detailed recommendations for MDRO control in all healthcare settings follow and are 
summarized in Table 3. Table 3, which applies to all healthcare settings, contains two tiers 
of activities. In the first tier are the baseline level of MDRO control activities designed to 
ensure recognition of MDROs as a problem, involvement of healthcare administrators, and 
provision of safeguards for managing unidentified carriers of MDROs.  
 
With the emergence of an MDRO problem that cannot be controlled with the basic set of 
infection control measures, additional control measures should be selected from the second 
tier of interventions presented in Table 3. Decisions to intensify MDRO control activity arise 
from surveillance observations and assessments of the risk to patients in various settings. 
Circumstances that may trigger these decisions include: 
• Identification of an MDRO from even one patient in a facility or special unit 
with a highly vulnerable patient population (e.g., an ICU, NICU, burn unit) that 
had previously not encountered that MDRO. 
• Failure to decrease the prevalence or incidence of a specific MDRO (e.g., 
incidence of resistant clinical isolates) despite infection control efforts to stop 
its transmission.(Statistical process control charts or other validated methods 
that account for normal variation can be used to track rates of targeted 
MDROs)(205, 325, 326). 
The combination of new or increased frequency of MDRO isolates and patients at risk 
necessitates escalation of efforts to achieve or re-establish control, i.e., to reduce rates of 
transmission to the lowest possible level.  Intensification of MDRO control activities should 
begin with an assessment of the problem and evaluation of the effectiveness of measures in 
current use. Once the problem is defined, appropriate additional control measures should 
be selected from the second tier of Table 3.  A knowledgeable infection prevention and 
control professional or healthcare epidemiologist should make this determination.  This 
approach requires support from the governing body and medical staff of the facility. Once 
interventions are implemented, ongoing surveillance should be used to determine whether 
selected control measures are effective and if additional measures or consultation are 
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indicated.  The result of this process should be to decrease MDRO rates to minimum levels. 
Healthcare facilities must not accept ongoing MDRO outbreaks or high endemic rates as the 
status quo. With selection of infection control measures appropriate to their situation, all 
facilities can achieve the desired goal and reduce the MDRO burden substantially. 
 34
V. Prevention of transmission of Multidrug Resistant Organisms (Table 3) 
 
The CDC/HICPAC system for categorizing recommendations is as follows: 
Category IA  Strongly recommended for implementation and strongly supported by well-
designed experimental, clinical, or epidemiologic studies. 
Category IB  Strongly recommended for implementation and supported by some 
experimental, clinical, or epidemiologic studies and a strong theoretical rationale. 
Category IC  Required for implementation, as mandated by federal and/or state regulation 
or standard. 
Category II  Suggested for implementation and supported by suggestive clinical or 
epidemiologic studies or a theoretical rationale. 
No recommendation Unresolved issue. Practices for which insufficient evidence or no 
consensus regarding efficacy exists. 
 
V.A. General recommendations for all healthcare settings independent of the prevalence 
of multidrug resistant organism (MDRO) infections or the population served. 
V.A.1. Administrative measures 
V.A.1.a. Make MDRO prevention and control an organizational patient safety 
priority.(3, 146, 151, 154, 182, 185, 194, 205, 208, 210, 242, 327, 328)  
Category IB 
V.A.1.b. Provide administrative support, and both fiscal and human resources, to 
prevent and control MDRO transmission within the healthcare organization 
(3, 9, 146, 152, 182-184, 208, 328, 329) Category IB 
V.A.1.c. In healthcare facilities without expertise for analyzing epidemiologic data, 
recognizing MDRO problems, or devising effective control strategies (e.g., 
small or rural hospitals, rehabilitation centers, long-term care facilities 
[LTCFs], freestanding ambulatory centers), identify experts who can 
provide consultation as needed.(151, 188)  Category II 
V.A.1.d. Implement systems to communicate information about reportable MDROs 
[e.g., VRSA, VISA, MRSA, Penicillin resistant S. pneumoniae(PRSP)] to 
administrative personnel and as required by state and local health 
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authorities (www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/nndsshis.htm). Refer to websites for 
updated requirements of local and state health departments. Category II/IC 
V.A.1.e. Implement a multidisciplinary process to monitor and improve healthcare 
personnel (HCP) adherence to recommended practices for Standard and 
Contact Precautions(3, 105, 182, 184, 189, 242, 273, 312, 330). Category 
IB 
V.A.1.f. Implement systems to designate patients known to be colonized or infected 
with a targeted MDRO and to notify receiving healthcare facilities and 
personnel prior to transfer of such patients within or between facilities.(87, 
151)  Category IB 
V.A.1.g. Support participation of the facility or healthcare system in local, regional, 
and national coalitions to combat emerging or growing MDRO 
problems.(41, 146, 151, 167, 188, 206, 207, 211, 331).  Category IB 
V.A.1.h. Provide updated feedback at least annually to healthcare providers and 
administrators on facility and patient-care-unit trends in MDRO infections. 
Include information on changes in prevalence or incidence of infection, 
results of assessments for system failures, and action plans to improve 
adherence to and effectiveness of recommended infection control practices 
to prevent MDRO transmission.(152, 154, 159, 184, 204, 205, 242, 312, 
332)  Category IB 
V.A.2. Education and training of healthcare personnel 
V.A.2.a. Provide education and training on risks and prevention of MDRO 
transmission during orientation and periodic educational updates for 
healthcare personnel; include information on organizational experience 
with MDROs and prevention strategies.(38, 152, 154, 173, 176, 189, 190, 
203, 204, 217, 242, 330, 333, 334)  Category IB 
V.A.3. Judicious use of antimicrobial agents. The goal of the following 
recommendations is to ensure that systems are in place to promote optimal 
treatment of infections and appropriate antimicrobial use. 
V.A.3.a. In hospitals and LTCFs, ensure that a multidisciplinary process is in place 
to review antimicrobial utilization, local susceptibility patterns 
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(antibiograms), and antimicrobial agents included in the formulary to foster 
appropriate antimicrobial use.(209, 212, 214, 215, 217, 242, 254, 334-339)  
Category IB 
V.A.3.b. Implement systems (e.g., computerized physician order entry, comment in 
microbiology susceptibility report, notification from a clinical pharmacist or 
unit director) to prompt clinicians to use the appropriate antimicrobial agent 
and regimen for the given clinical situation.(156, 157, 161, 166, 174, 175, 
212, 214, 218, 254, 334, 335, 337, 340-346)  Category IB 
V.A.3.b.i. Provide clinicians with antimicrobial susceptibility reports and 
analysis of current trends, updated at least annually, to guide 
antimicrobial prescribing practices.(342, 347)  Category IB 
V.A.3.b.ii. In settings that administer antimicrobial agents but have limited 
electronic communication system infrastructures to implement 
physician prompts (e.g., LTCFs, home care and infusion 
companies), implement a process for appropriate review of 
prescribed antimicrobials. Prepare and distribute reports to 
prescribers that summarize findings and provide suggestions for 
improving antimicrobial use. (342, 348, 349) Category II 
V.A.4. Surveillance 
V.A.4.a. In microbiology laboratories, use standardized laboratory methods and 
follow published guidance for determining antimicrobial susceptibility of 
targeted (e.g., MRSA, VRE, MDR-ESBLs) and emerging (e.g., VRSA, 
MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii) MDROs.(8, 154, 177, 190, 193, 209, 254, 
347, 350-353)  Category IB               
V.A.4.b.  In all healthcare organizations, establish systems to ensure that clinical 
microbiology laboratories (in-house and out-sourced) promptly notify 
infection control staff or a medical director/ designee when a novel 
resistance pattern for that facility is detected.(9, 22, 154, 162, 169)   
Category IB 
V.A.4.c. In hospitals and LTCFs, develop and implement laboratory protocols for 
storing isolates of selected MDROs for molecular typing when needed to 
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confirm transmission or delineate the epidemiology of the MDRO within the 
healthcare setting.(7, 8, 38, 140, 153, 154, 187, 190, 208, 217, 354, 355)  
Category IB 
V.A.4.d. Prepare facility-specific antimicrobial susceptibility reports as 
recommended by the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) 
(www.phppo.cdc.gov/dls/master/default.aspx); monitor these reports for 
evidence of changing resistance patterns that may indicate the emergence 
or transmission of MDROs.(347, 351, 356, 357)   Category IB/IC 
V.A.4.d.i. In hospitals and LTCFs with special-care units (e.g., ventilator-
dependent, ICU, or oncology units), develop and monitor unit-
specific antimicrobial susceptibility reports.(358-361)    Category IB   
V.A.4.d.ii. Establish a frequency for preparing summary reports based on 
volume of clinical isolates, with updates at least annually.(347, 362)   
Category II/IC 
V.A.4.d.iii. In healthcare organizations that outsource microbiology laboratory 
services (e.g., ambulatory care, home care, LTCFs, smaller acute 
care hospitals), specify by contract that the laboratory provide either 
facility-specific susceptibility data or local or regional aggregate 
susceptibility data in order to identify prevalent MDROs and trends 
in the geographic area served.(363)  Category II 
V.A.4.e. Monitor trends in the incidence of target MDROs in the facility over time 
using appropriate statistical methods to determine whether MDRO rates 
are decreasing and whether additional interventions are needed.(152, 154, 
183, 193, 205, 209, 217, 242, 300, 325, 326, 364, 365)   Category IA 
V.A.4.e.i. Specify isolate origin (i.e., location and clinical service) in MDRO 
monitoring protocols in hospitals and other large multi-unit facilities 
with high-risk patients.(8, 38, 152-154, 217, 358, 361)   Category IB 
V.A.4.e.ii. Establish a baseline (e.g., incidence) for targeted MDRO isolates by 
reviewing results of clinical cultures; if more timely or localized 
information is needed, perform baseline point prevalence studies of 
colonization in high-risk units. When possible, distinguish 
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colonization from infection in analysis of these data.(152, 153, 183, 
184, 189, 190, 193, 205, 242, 365)  Category IB 
V.A.5. Infection control precautions to prevent transmission of MDROs 
V.A.5.a. Follow Standard Precautions during all patient encounters in all settings in 
which healthcare is delivered.(119, 164, 255, 315, 316)   Category IB 
V.A.5.b. Use masks according to Standard Precautions when performing splash-
generating procedures (e.g., wound irrigation, oral suctioning, intubation); 
when caring for patients with open tracheostomies and the potential for 
projectile secretions; and in circumstances where there is evidence of 
transmission from heavily colonized sources (e.g., burn wounds). Masks 
are not otherwise recommended for prevention of MDRO transmission 
from patients to healthcare personnel during routine care (e.g., upon room 
entry).(8, 22, 151, 152, 154, 189, 190, 193, 208, 240, 366)   Category IB 
V.A.5.c. Use of Contact Precautions 
V.A.5.c.i. In acute-care hospitals, implement Contact Precautions routinely for 
all patients infected with target MDROs and for patients that have 
been previously identified as being colonized with target MDROs 
(e.g., patients transferred from other units or facilities who are 
known to be colonized). (11, 38, 68, 114, 151, 183, 188, 204, 217, 
242, 304)  Category IB 
V.A.5.c.ii. In LTCFs, consider the individual patient’s clinical situation and 
prevalence or incidence of MDRO in the facility when deciding 
whether to implement or modify Contact Precautions in addition to 
Standard Precautions for a patient infected or colonized with a 
target MDRO. Category II 
V.A.5.c.ii.1. For relatively healthy residents (e.g., mainly independent) follow 
Standard Precautions, making sure that gloves and gowns are 
used for contact with uncontrolled secretions, pressure ulcers, 
draining wounds, stool incontinence, and ostomy tubes/bags. (78-
80, 85, 151, 367, 368)  Category II  
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V.A.5.c.ii.2. For ill residents (e.g., those totally dependent upon healthcare 
personnel for healthcare and activities of daily living, ventilator-
dependent) and for those residents whose infected secretions or 
drainage cannot be contained, use Contact Precautions in 
addition to Standard Precautions.(316, 369, 370)   Category II 
V.A.5.c.iii. For MDRO colonized or infected patients without draining wounds, 
diarrhea, or uncontrolled secretions, establish ranges of permitted 
ambulation, socialization, and use of common areas based on their 
risk to other patients and on the ability of the colonized or infected 
patients to observe proper hand hygiene and other recommended 
precautions to contain secretions and excretions.(151, 163, 371)  
Category II  
V.A.5.d. In ambulatory settings, use Standard Precautions for patients known to be 
infected or colonized with target MDROs, making sure that gloves and 
gowns are used for contact with uncontrolled secretions, pressure ulcers, 
draining wounds, stool incontinence, and ostomy tubes and bags. Category 
II 
V.A.5.e. In home care settings 
 Follow Standard Precautions making sure to use gowns and 
gloves for contact with uncontrolled secretions, pressure ulcers, 
draining wounds, stool incontinence, and ostomy tubes and 
bags. Category II 
 Limit the amount of reusable patient-care equipment that is 
brought into the home of patients infected or colonized with 
MDROs. When possible, leave patient-care equipment in the 
home until the patient is discharged from home care services. 
Category II 
 If noncritical patient-care equipment (e.g., stethoscopes) cannot 
remain in the home, clean and disinfect items before removing 
them from the home, using a low to intermediate level 
disinfectant, or place reusable items in a plastic bag for transport 
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to another site for subsequent cleaning and disinfection. 
Category II 
V.A.5.e.i. No recommendation is made for routine use of gloves, gowns, or 
both to prevent MDRO transmission in ambulatory or home care 
settings. Unresolved issue 
V.A.5.e.ii. In hemodialysis units, follow the “Recommendations to Prevent 
Transmission of Infections in Chronic Hemodialysis 
Patients”(372)(www.cms.hhs.gov/home/regsguidance.asp). 
Category IC 
V.A.5.f. Discontinuation of Contact Precautions. No recommendation can be made 
regarding when to discontinue Contact Precautions. Unresolved issue (See 
Background for discussion of options) 
V.A.5.g. Patient placement in hospitals and LTCFs 
V.A.5.g.i. When single-patient rooms are available, assign priority for these 
rooms to patients with known or suspected MDRO colonization or 
infection. Give highest priority to those patients who have conditions 
that may facilitate transmission, e.g., uncontained secretions or 
excretions.(8, 38, 110, 151, 188, 208, 240, 304)   Category IB  
V.A.5.g.ii. When single-patient rooms are not available, cohort patients with 
the same MDRO in the same room or patient-care area.(8, 38, 92, 
151-153, 162, 183, 184, 188, 217, 242, 304)   Category IB 
V.A.5.g.iii. When cohorting patients with the same MDRO is not possible, place 
MDRO patients in rooms with patients who are at low risk for 
acquisition of MDROs and associated adverse outcomes from 
infection and are likely to have short lengths of stay. Category II  
V.A.6. Environmental measures 
V.A.6.a. Clean and disinfect surfaces and equipment that may be contaminated with 
pathogens, including those that are in close proximity to the patient (e.g., 
bed rails, over bed tables) and frequently-touched surfaces in the patient 
care environment (e.g., door knobs, surfaces in and surrounding toilets in 
patients’ rooms) on a more frequent schedule compared to that for minimal 
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touch surfaces (e.g., horizontal surfaces in waiting rooms).(111, 297, 373)  
Category IB 
V.A.6.b. Dedicate noncritical medical items to use on individual patients known to 
be infected or colonized with MDROs.(38, 217, 324, 374, 375)   Category 
IB  
V.A.6.c. Prioritize room cleaning of patients on Contact Precautions. Focus on 
cleaning and disinfecting frequently touched surfaces (e.g., bedrails, 
bedside commodes, bathroom fixtures in the patient’s room, doorknobs) 
and equipment in the immediate vicinity of the patient.(109, 110, 114-117, 
297, 301, 373, 376, 377)   Category IB   
V.B. Intensified interventions to prevent MDRO transmission 
The interventions presented below have been utilized in various combinations to 
reduce transmission of MDROs in healthcare facilities. Neither the effectiveness of 
individual components nor that of specific combinations of control measures has 
been assessed in controlled trials. Nevertheless, various combinations of control 
elements selected under the guidance of knowledgeable content experts have 
repeatedly reduced MDRO transmission rates in a variety of healthcare settings. 
V.B.1. Indications and approach 
V.B.1.a. Indications for intensified MDRO control efforts (VII.B.1.a.i and VII.B.1.a.ii) 
should result in selection and implementation of one or more of the 
interventions described in VII.B.2 to VII.B.8 below. Individualize the 
selection of control measures according to local considerations(8, 11, 38, 
68, 114, 152-154, 183-185, 189, 190, 193, 194, 209, 217, 242, 312, 364, 
365).  Category IB 
V.B.1.a.i. When incidence or prevalence of MDROs are not decreasing 
despite implementation of and correct adherence to the routine 
control measures described above, intensify MDRO control efforts 
by adopting one or more of the interventions described below.(92, 
152, 183, 184, 193, 365) Category IB 
V.B.1.a.ii. When the first case or outbreak of an epidemiologically important 
MDRO (e.g., VRE, MRSA, VISA, VRSA, MDR-GNB) is identified 
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within a healthcare facility or unit.(22, 23, 25, 68, 170, 172, 184, 
240, 242, 378) Category IB 
V.B.1.b. Continue to monitor the incidence of target MDRO infection and 
colonization after additional interventions are implemented. If rates do not 
decrease, implement more interventions as needed to reduce MDRO 
transmission.(11, 38, 68, 92, 152, 175, 184, 365) Category IB 
V.B.2. Administrative measures 
V.B.2.a. Identify persons with experience in infection control and the epidemiology 
of MDRO, either in house or through outside consultation, for assessment 
of the local MDRO problem and for the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of appropriate control measures (3, 68, 146, 151-154, 167, 184, 
190, 193, 242, 328, 377). Category IB 
V.B.2.b. Provide necessary leadership, funding, and day-to-day oversight to 
implement interventions selected. Involve the governing body and 
leadership of the healthcare facility or system that have organizational 
responsibility for this and other infection control efforts.(8, 38, 152, 154, 
184, 189, 190, 208) Category IB 
V.B.2.c. Evaluate healthcare system factors for their role in creating or perpetuating 
transmission of MDROs, including: staffing levels, education and training, 
availability of consumable and durable resources, communication 
processes, policies and procedures, and adherence to recommended 
infection control measures (e.g., hand hygiene and Standard or Contact 
Precautions). Develop, implement, and monitor action plans to correct 
system failures.(3, 8, 38, 152, 154, 172, 173, 175, 188, 196, 198, 199, 208, 
217, 280, 324, 379, 380) Category IB 
V.B.2.d. During the process, update healthcare providers and administrators on the 
progress and effectiveness of the intensified interventions. Include 
information on changes in prevalence, rates of infection and colonization; 
results of assessments and corrective actions for system failures; degrees 
of adherence to recommended practices; and action plans to improve 
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adherence to recommended infection control practices to prevent MDRO 
transmission.(152, 154, 159, 184, 204, 205, 312, 332, 381) Category IB 
V.B.3. Educational interventions 
Intensify the frequency of MDRO educational programs for healthcare 
personnel, especially those who work in areas in which MDRO rates are not 
decreasing. Provide individual or unit-specific feedback when available.(3, 38, 
152, 154, 159, 170, 182, 183, 189, 190, 193, 194, 204, 205, 209, 215, 218, 
312) Category IB 
V.B.4. Judicious use of antimicrobial agents 
Review the role of antimicrobial use in perpetuating the MDRO problem 
targeted for intensified intervention. Control and improve antimicrobial use as 
indicated. Antimicrobial agents that may be targeted include vancomycin, 
third-generation cephalosporins, and anti-anaerobic agents for VRE(217); 
third-generation cephalosporins for ESBLs(212, 214, 215); and quinolones 
and carbapenems(80, 156, 166, 174, 175, 209, 218, 242, 254, 329, 334, 335, 
337, 341). Category IB 
V.B.5. Surveillance 
V.B.5.a. Calculate and analyze prevalence and incidence rates of targeted MDRO 
infection and colonization in populations at risk; when possible, distinguish 
colonization from infection(152, 153, 183, 184, 189, 190, 193, 205, 215, 
242, 365). Category IB 
V.B.5.a.i. Include only one isolate per patient, not multiple isolates from the 
same patient, when calculating rates(347, 382). Category II 
V.B.5.a.ii. Increase the frequency of compiling and monitoring antimicrobial 
susceptibility summary reports for a targeted MDRO as indicated by 
an increase in incidence of infection or colonization with that MDRO. 
Category II 
V.B.5.b. Develop and implement protocols to obtain active surveillance cultures 
(ASC) for targeted MDROs from patients in populations at risk (e.g., 
patients in intensive care, burn, bone marrow/stem cell transplant, and 
oncology units; patients transferred from facilities known to have high 
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MDRO prevalence rates; roommates of colonized or infected persons; and 
patients known to have been previously infected or colonized with an 
MDRO).(8, 38, 68, 114, 151-154, 167, 168, 183, 184, 187-190, 192, 193, 
217, 242)  Category IB 
V.B.5.b.i. Obtain ASC from areas of skin breakdown and draining wounds. In 
addition, include the following sites according to target MDROs: 
V.B.5.b.i.1. For MRSA: Sampling the anterior nares is usually sufficient; 
throat, endotracheal tube aspirate, percutaneous gastrostomy 
sites, and perirectal or perineal cultures may be added to increase 
the yield. Swabs from several sites may be placed in the same 
selective broth tube prior to transport.(117, 383, 384)  Category IB 
V.B.5.b.i.2. For VRE: Stool, rectal, or perirectal samples should be 
collected.(154, 193, 217, 242) 
Category IB 
V.B.5.b.i.3. For MDR-GNB: Endotracheal tube aspirates or sputum should 
be cultured if a respiratory tract reservoir is suspected, (e.g., 
Acinetobacter spp., Burkholderia spp.).(385, 386)  Category IB. 
V.B.5.b.ii. Obtain surveillance cultures for the target MDRO from patients at 
the time of admission to high-risk areas, e.g., ICUs, and at periodic 
intervals as needed to assess MDRO transmission.(8, 151, 154, 
159, 184, 208, 215, 242, 387)  Category IB 
V.B.5.c. Conduct culture surveys to assess the efficacy of the enhanced MDRO 
control interventions. 
V.B.5.c.i. Conduct serial (e.g., weekly, until transmission has ceased and then 
decreasing frequency) unit-specific point prevalence culture surveys 
of the target MDRO to determine if transmission has decreased or 
ceased.(107, 167, 175, 184, 188, 218, 339)  Category IB 
V.B.5.c.ii. Repeat point-prevalence culture surveys at routine intervals or at 
time of patient discharge or transfer until transmission has 
ceased.(8, 152-154, 168, 178, 190, 215, 218, 242, 388) Category IB 
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V.B.5.c.iii. If indicated by assessment of the MDRO problem, collect cultures to 
asses the colonization status of roommates and other patients with 
substantial exposure to patients with known MDRO infection or 
colonization.(25, 68, 167, 193)  Category IB 
V.B.5.d. Obtain cultures of healthcare personnel for target MDRO when there is 
epidemiologic evidence implicating the healthcare staff member as a 
source of ongoing transmission.(153, 365)  Category IB 
V.B.6. Enhanced infection control precautions 
V.B.6.a. Use of Contact Precautions 
V.B.6.a.i. Implement Contact Precautions routinely for all patients colonized or 
infected with a target MDRO.(8, 11, 38, 68, 114, 151, 154, 183, 188, 
189, 217, 242, 304)  Category IA 
V.B.6.a.ii. Because environmental surfaces and medical equipment, especially 
those in close proximity to the patient, may be contaminated, don 
gowns and gloves before or upon entry to the patient’s room or 
cubicle.(38, 68, 154, 187, 189, 242) Category IB 
V.B.6.a.iii. In LTCFs, modify Contact Precautions to allow MDRO-
colonized/infected patients whose site of colonization or infection 
can be appropriately contained and who can observe good hand 
hygiene practices to enter common areas and participate in group 
activities.(78, 86, 151, 367)  Category IB  
V.B.6.b. When ASC are obtained as part of an intensified  MDRO control program, 
implement Contact Precautions until the surveillance culture is reported 
negative for the target MDRO.(8, 30, 153, 389, 390)  Category IB 
V.B.6.c. No recommendation is made regarding universal use of gloves, gowns, or 
both in high-risk units in acute-care hospitals.(153, 273, 312, 320, 391)   
Unresolved issue 
V.B.7. Implement policies for patient admission and placement as needed to prevent 
transmission of a problem MDRO.(183, 184, 189, 193, 242, 339, 392)  
Category IB 
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V.B.7.a.i. Place MDRO patients in single-patient rooms.(6, 151, 158, 160, 166, 
170, 187, 208, 240, 282, 393-395)  Category IB 
V.B.7.a.ii. Cohort patients with the same MDRO in designated  areas (e.g., 
rooms, bays, patient care areas.(8, 151, 152, 159, 161, 176, 181, 
183, 184, 188, 208, 217, 242, 280, 339, 344)  Category IB 
V.B.7.a.iii. When transmission continues despite adherence to Standard and 
Contact Precautions and cohorting patients, assign dedicated 
nursing and ancillary service staff to the care of MDRO patients 
only.  Some facilities may consider this option when intensified 
measures are first implemented.(184, 217, 242, 278)  Category IB 
V.B.7.a.iv. Stop new admissions to the unit of facility if transmission continues 
despite the implementation of the enhanced control measures 
described above. (Refer to state or local regulations that may apply 
upon closure of hospital units or services.).(9, 38, 146, 159, 161, 
168, 175, 205, 279, 280, 332, 339, 396)  Category IB 
V.B.8. Enhanced environmental measures 
V.B.8.a. Implement patient-dedicated or single-use disposable  noncritical 
equipment (e.g., blood pressure cuff, stethoscope) and instruments and 
devices.(38, 104, 151, 156, 159, 163, 181, 217, 324, 329, 367, 389, 390, 
394)  Category IB 
V.B.8.b. Intensify and reinforce training of environmental staff who work in areas 
targeted for intensified MDRO control and monitor adherence to 
environmental cleaning policies. Some facilities may choose to assign 
dedicated staff to targeted patient care areas to enhance consistency of 
proper environmental cleaning and disinfection services.(38, 154, 159, 165, 
172, 173, 175, 178-181, 193, 205, 208, 217, 279, 301, 327, 339, 397)  
Category IB 
V.B.8.c. Monitor (i.e., supervise and inspect) cleaning performance to ensure 
consistent cleaning and disinfection of surfaces in close proximity to the 
patient and those likely to be touched by the patient and HCP (e.g., 
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bedrails, carts, bedside commodes, doorknobs, faucet handles).(8, 38, 
109, 111, 154, 169, 180, 208, 217, 301, 333, 398)  Category IB 
V.B.8.d. Obtain environmental cultures (e.g., surfaces, shared medical equipment) 
when there is epidemiologic evidence that an environmental source is 
associated with ongoing transmission of the targeted MDRO.(399-402)  
Category IB 
V.B.8.e. Vacate units for environmental assessment and intensive cleaning when 
previous efforts to eliminate environmental reservoirs have failed.(175, 
205, 279, 339, 403)  Category II 
V.B.9. Decolonization 
V.B.9.a. Consult with physicians with expertise in infectious diseases and/or 
healthcare epidemiology on a case-by-case basis regarding the 
appropriate use of decolonization therapy for patients or staff during limited 
periods of time, as a component of an intensified MRSA control program 
).(152, 168, 170, 172, 183, 194, 304) Category II 
V.B.9.b. When decolonization for MRSA is used, perform susceptibility testing for 
the decolonizing agent against the target organism in the individual being 
treated or the MDRO strain that is epidemiologically implicated in 
transmission. Monitor susceptibility to detect emergence of resistance to 
the decolonizing agent. Consult with a microbiologist for appropriate testing 
for mupirocin resistance, since standards have not been established.(289, 
290, 304, 308) Category IB 
V.B.9.b.i. Because mupirocin-resistant strains may emerge and because it is 
unusual to eradicate MRSA when multiple body sites are colonized, 
do not use topical mupirocin routinely for MRSA decolonization of 
patients as a component of MRSA control programs in any 
healthcare setting.(289, 404)  Category IB 
V.B.9.b.ii. Limit decolonization of HCP found to be colonized with MRSA to 
persons who have been epidemiologically linked as a likely source 
of ongoing transmission to patients. Consider reassignment of HCP 
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if decolonization is not successful and ongoing transmission to 
patients persists.(120, 122, 168)  Category IB 
V.B.9.c. No recommendation can be made for decolonizing patients with VRE or 
MDR-GNB. Regimens and efficacy of decolonization protocols for VRE and 





Glossary - Multidrug-Resistant Organisms 
 
Ambulatory care settings. Facilities that provide health care to patients who do not remain 
overnight (e.g., hospital-based outpatient clinics, nonhospital-based clinics and physician 
offices, urgent care centers, surgicenters, free-standing dialysis centers, public health 
clinics, imaging centers, ambulatory behavioral health and substance abuse clinics, physical 
therapy and rehabilitation centers, and dental practices. 
 
Cohorting. In the context of this guideline, this term applies to the practice of grouping 
patients infected or colonized with the same infectious agent together to confine their care 
to one area and prevent contact with susceptible patients (cohorting patients). During 
outbreaks, healthcare personnel may be assigned to a cohort of patients to further limit 
opportunities for transmission (cohorting staff). 
 
Contact Precautions. Contact Precautions are a set of practices used to prevent 
transmission of infectious agents that are spread by direct or indirect contact with the patient 
or the patient’s environment.  Contact Precautions also apply where the presence of 
excessive wound drainage, fecal incontinence, or other discharges from the body suggest 
an increased transmission risk.  A single patient room is preferred for patients who require 
Contact Precautions. When a single patient room is not available, consultation with infection 
control is helpful to assess the various risks associated with other patient placement options 
(e.g., cohorting, keeping the patient with an existing roommate).  In multi-patient rooms, >3 
feet spatial separation of between beds is advised to reduce the opportunities for 
inadvertent sharing of items  between the infected/colonized patient and other patients. 
Healthcare personnel caring for patients on Contact Precautions wear a gown and gloves 
for all interactions that may involve contact with the patient or potentially contaminated 
areas in the patient’s environment. Donning of gown and gloves upon room entry, removal 
before exiting the patient room and performance of hand hygiene immediately upon exiting 





Epidemiologically important pathogens. Infectious agents that have one or more of the 
following characteristics: 1)A propensity for transmission within healthcare facilities based 
on published reports and the occurrence of temporal or geographic clusters of  > 2 patients, 
(e.g., VRE, MRSA and MSSA, Clostridium difficile, norovirus, RSV, influenza, rotavirus, 
Enterobacter spp; Serratia spp., group A streptococcus). However, for group A 
streptococcus, most experts consider a single case of healthcare-associated disease a 
trigger for investigation and enhanced control measures because of the devastating 
outcomes associated with HAI group A streptococcus infections. For susceptible bacteria 
that are known to be associated with asymptomatic colonization, isolation from normally 
sterile body fluids in patients with significant clinical disease would be the trigger to consider 
the organism as epidemiologically important. 2) Antimicrobial resistance implications: 
o Resistance to first-line therapies (e.g., MRSA, VRE, VISA, VRSA, ESBL-
producing organisms). 
o Unusual or usual agents with unusual patterns of resistance within a facility, 
(e.g., the first isolate of Burkholderia cepacia complex or Ralstonia spp. in 
non-CF patients or a quinolone-resistant strain of Pseudomonas in a facility. 
o Difficult to treat because of innate or acquired resistance to multiple classes of 
antimicrobial agents (e.g., Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, Acinetobacter spp.). 
3) Associated with serious clinical disease, increased morbidity and mortality (e.g., MRSA 
and MSSA, group A streptococcus); or 4) A newly discovered or reemerging pathogen. The 
strategies described for MDROs may be applied for control of epidemiologically important 
organisms other than MDROs. 
 
Hand hygiene. A general term that applies to any one of the following: 1) handwashing with 
plain (nonantimicrobial) soap and water); 2) antiseptic hand wash (soap containing 
antiseptic agents and water); 3) antiseptic hand rub (waterless antiseptic product, most 
often alcohol-based, rubbed on all surfaces of hands); or 4) surgical hand antisepsis 
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(antiseptic hand wash or antiseptic hand rub performed preoperatively by surgical personnel 
to eliminate transient hand flora and reduce resident hand flora).   
 
Healthcare-associated infection (HAI). An infection that develops in a patient who is cared 
for in any setting where healthcare is delivered (e.g., acute care hospital, chronic care 
facility, ambulatory clinic, dialysis center, surgicenter, home) and is related to receiving 
health care (i.e., was not incubating or present at the time healthcare was provided). In 
ambulatory and home settings, HAI would apply to any infection that is associated with a 
medical or surgical intervention performed in those settings.   
 
Healthcare epidemiologist A person whose primary training is medical (M.D., D.O.) and/or 
masters or doctorate-level epidemiology who has received advanced training in healthcare 
epidemiology. Typically these professionals direct or provide consultation to an infection 
prevention and control program in a hospital, long term care facility (LTCF), or healthcare 
delivery system (also see infection prevention and control professional). 
 
Healthcare personnel (HCP). All paid and unpaid persons who work in a healthcare 
setting, also known as healthcare workers (e.g. any person who has professional or 
technical training in a healthcare-related field and provides patient care in a healthcare 
setting or any person who provides services that support the delivery of healthcare such as 
dietary, housekeeping, engineering, maintenance personnel). 
 
Home care. A wide-range of medical, nursing, rehabilitation, hospice, and social services 
delivered to patients in their place of residence (e.g., private residence, senior living center, 
assisted living facility). Home health-care services include care provided by home health 
aides and skilled nurses, respiratory therapists, dieticians, physicians, chaplains, and 
volunteers; provision of durable medical equipment; home infusion therapy; and physical, 
speech, and occupational therapy. 
 
Infection prevention and control professional (ICP). A person whose primary training is 
in either nursing, medical technology, microbiology, or epidemiology and who has acquired 
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specialized training in infection control. Responsibilities may include collection, analysis, and 
feedback of infection data and trends to healthcare providers; consultation on infection risk 
assessment, prevention and control strategies; performance of education and training 
activities; implementation of evidence-based infection control practices or those mandated 
by regulatory and licensing agencies; application of epidemiologic principles to improve 
patient outcomes; participation in planning renovation and construction projects (e.g., to 
ensure appropriate containment of construction dust); evaluation of new products or 
procedures on patient outcomes; oversight of employee health services related to infection 
prevention; implementation of preparedness plans; communication within the healthcare 
setting, with local and state health departments, and with the community at large concerning 
infection control issues; and participation in research.  
 
Infection prevention and control program. A multidisciplinary program that includes a 
group of activities to ensure that recommended practices for the prevention of healthcare-
associated infections are implemented and followed by healthcare personnel, making the 
healthcare setting safe from infection for patients and healthcare personnel. The Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) requires the following 
five components of an infection prevention and control program for accreditation: 1) 
surveillance: monitoring patients and healthcare personnel for acquisition of infection and/or 
colonization; 2) investigation: identification and analysis of infection problems or undesirable 
trends; 3) prevention: implementation of measures to prevent transmission of infectious 
agents and to reduce risks for device- and procedure-related infections; 4) control: 
evaluation and management of outbreaks; and 5) reporting: provision of information to 
external agencies as required by state and federal law and regulation (www.jcaho.org). The 
infection prevention and control program staff has the ultimate authority to determine 
infection control policies for a healthcare organization with the approval of the organization’s 
governing body.  
Long-term care facilities (LTCFs).An array of residential and outpatient facilities designed 
to meet the bio-psychosocial needs of persons with sustained self-care deficits. These 
include skilled nursing facilities, chronic disease hospitals, nursing homes, foster and group 
homes, institutions for the developmentally disabled, residential care facilities, assisted 
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living facilities, retirement homes, adult day health care facilities, rehabilitation centers, and 
long-term psychiatric hospitals.  
 
Mask. A term that applies collectively to items used to cover the nose and mouth and 
includes both procedure masks and surgical masks 
(www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/094.html#4). 
 
Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs). In general, bacteria (excluding M. tuberculosis) 
that are resistant to one or more classes of antimicrobial agents  and usually are resistant to 
all but one or two commercially available antimicrobial agents (e.g., MRSA, VRE, extended 
spectrum beta-lactamase [ESBL]-producing or intrinsically resistant gram-negative bacilli). 
        
Nosocomial infection. Derived from two Greek words “nosos” (disease) and “komeion” (to 
take care of). Refers to any infection that develops during or as a result of an admission to 
an acute care facility (hospital) and was not incubating at the time of admission. 
 
Standard Precautions. A group of infection prevention practices that apply to all patients, 
regardless of suspected or confirmed diagnosis or presumed infection status. Standard 
Precautions are a combination and expansion of Universal Precautions and Body 
Substance Isolation.  Standard Precautions are based on the principle that all blood, body 
fluids, secretions, excretions except sweat, nonintact skin, and mucous membranes may 
contain transmissible infectious agents. Standard Precautions includes hand hygiene, and 
depending on the anticipated exposure, use of gloves, gown, mask, eye protection, or face 
shield. Also, equipment or items in the patient environment likely to have been 
contaminated with infectious fluids must be handled in a manner to prevent transmission of 
infectious agents, (e.g. wear gloves for handling, contain heavily soiled equipment, properly 
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Table 1.  Categorization of Reports about Control of MDROs in Healthcare Settings, 1982-
2005 
 
MDRO MDR-GNB MRSA VRE 
No. of Studies 
Reviewed/category 
30 35 39 
Types of Healthcare Facilities from which Study or Report Arose 
No. (%) from 
academic 
facilitiesα 
30 (100) 28 (80) 33 (85) 
No. (%) from other 
hospitals 
0 4 (11) 3 (8) 
No. (%) from 
LTCFs 
0 1 (3) 2 (5) 
No. (%) from 
multiple facilities in 
a region 
0 2 (6) 1 (2) 
Unit of Study for MDRO Control Efforts 
Special unitβ 20 13 19 
Hospital 10 19 17 
LTCF 0 1 2 
Region 0 2 1 
Nature of Study or Report on MDRO Controlχ 
Outbreak 22 19 28 
Non-outbreak 8 16 11 
Total Period of Observation after Interventions Introduced 
Less than 1 year 17 14 25 
1-2 years 6 6 6 
2-5 years 5 11 8 
Greater than 5 
years 
2 4  
Numbers of Control Measures Employed in Outbreaks/Studies 
Range 2-12 0-11 1-12 
Median 7 7 8 
Mode 8 7 9 
α Variably described as university hospitals, medical school affiliated hospitals, VA teaching 
hospitals, and, to a much lesser extent, community teaching hospitals 
β Includes intensive care units, burn units, dialysis units, hematology/oncology units, neonatal 
units, neonatal intensive care units, and, in a few instances, individual wards of a hospital 
χ Based on authors’ description – if they called their experience an outbreak or not; authors 





Table 2. Control Measures for MDROs Employed in Studies Performed  in Healthcare 
Settings, 1982-2005 
 
Focus of MDRO 







 No. (%) of Studies Using Control Measure
Education of staff, patients or 
visitors 
19 (63) 11 (31) 20 (53) 
Emphasis on handwashing 16 (53) 21 (60) 9 (23) 
Use of antiseptics for 
handwashing 
8 (30)  12 (36) 16 (41) 
Contact Precautions or glove useα 20 (67) 27 (77) 34 (87) 
Private Rooms 4 (15) 10 (28) 10 (27) 
Segregation of cases 4 (15) 3 (9) 5 (14) 
Cohorting of Patients 11 (37) 12 (34) 14 (36) 
Cohorting of Staff 2 (7) 6 (17) 9 (23) 
Change in Antimicrobial Use 12 (41) 1 (3) 17 (44) 
Surveillance cultures of patients 19 (63) 34 (97) 36 (92) 
Surveillance cultures of staff 9 (31) 8 (23) 7 (19) 
Environmental cultures 15 (50) 14 (42) 15 (38) 
Extra cleaning & disinfection 11 (37) 7 (21) 20 (51) 
Dedicated Equipment 5 (17) 0 12 (32) 
Decolonization 3 (10) 25 (71) 4 (11) 
Ward closure to new admission or 
to all patients 
6 (21) 4 (12) 5 (14) 
Other miscellaneous measures 6 (22) β 9 (27)χ 17 (44)δ 
α Contact Precautions mentioned specifically, use of gloves with gowns or aprons mentioned, 
barrier precautions, strict isolation, all included under this heading 
β includes signage, record flagging, unannounced inspections, selective decontamination, and 
peer compliance monitoring (1 to 4 studies employing any of these measures)  
χ includes requirements for masks, signage, record tracking, alerts, early discharge, and 
preventive isolation of new admissions pending results of screening cultures (1 to 4 studies 
employing any of these measures) 
δ includes computer flags, signage, requirement for mask, one-to-one nursing, changing type of 
thermometer used, and change in rounding sequence (1 to 7 studies employing any of these 
measures) 
 
References for Tables 1 and 2 
 
MDR-GNBs: (6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 38, 174, 175, 180, 209, 210, 213-215, 218, 334, 388, 406, 407) 
 
MRSA: (68, 89, 152, 153, 165-173, 183, 188, 194, 204, 205, 208, 240, 269, 279, 280, 289, 304, 









Tier 1.  General Recommendations for Routine Prevention and Control of MDROs in Healthcare Settings 
Administrative 
Measures/Adherence Monitoring MDRO Education 
Judicious 
Antimicrobial Use Surveillance 
Infection Control Precautions to Prevent 
Transmission Environmental Measures Decolonization 
Make MDRO prevention/control an 
organizational priority. Provide 
administrative support and both fiscal 
and human resources to prevent and 
control MDRO transmission. (IB) 
Identify experts who can provide 
consultation and expertise for analyzing 
epidemiologic data, recognizing MDRO 
problems, or devising effective control 
strategies, as needed. (II) 
Implement systems to communicate 
information about reportable MDROs 
to administrative personnel and 
state/local health departments. (II) 
Implement a multi-disciplinary process 
to monitor and improve HCP adherence 
to recommended practices for Standard 
and Contact Precautions.(IB)   
Implement systems to designate 
patients known to be colonized or 
infected with a targeted MDRO and to 
notify receiving healthcare facilities or 
personnel prior to transfer of such 
patients within or between facilities. (IB) 
Support participation in local, regional 
and/or national coalitions to combat 
emerging or growing MDRO 
problems.(IB) 
Provide updated feedback at least 
annually to healthcare providers and 
administrators on facility and patient-
care unit MDRO infections.  Include 
information on changes in prevalence 
and incidence, problem assessment 




Provide education and training 
on risks and prevention of 
MDRO transmission during 
orientation and periodic 
educational updates for HCP; 
include information on 
organizational experience with 
MDROs and prevention 
strategies. (IB) 
In hospitals and 
LTCFs, ensure that a 
multi-disciplinary 





included in the 
formulary, to foster 
appropriate 




comment, pharmacy or 
unit director 
notification) to prompt 
clinicians to use the 
appropriate agent and 
regimen for the given 
clinical situation. (IB) 
Provide clinicians with 
antimicrobial 
susceptibility reports 
and analysis of current 
trends, updated at least 









prompts, etc., at a 
minimum implement a 
process to review 
antibiotic use. Prepare 
and distribute reports 
to providers. (II) 
 
 
Use standardized laboratory methods 
and follow published guidelines for 
determining antimicrobial 
susceptibilities of targeted and 
emerging MDROs. 
Establish systems to ensure that 
clinical micro labs (in-house and 
outsourced) promptly notify infection 
control or a medical director/designee 
when a novel resistance pattern for 
that facility is detected. (IB) 
In hospitals and LTCFs: 
…develop and implement laboratory 
protocols for storing isolates of 
selected MDROs for molecular typing 
when needed to confirm transmission 
or delineate epidemiology of MDRO 
in facility. (IB) 
…establish laboratory-based systems 
to detect and communicate evidence 
of MDROs in clinical isolates (IB) 
…prepare facility-specific 
antimicrobial susceptibility reports as 
recommended by CLSI; monitor 
reports for evidence of changing 
resistance that may indicate 
emergence or transmission of 
MDROs (IA/IC) 
…develop and monitor special-care 
unit-specific antimicrobial 
susceptibility reports (e.g., ventilator-
dependent units, ICUs, oncology 
units). (IB) 
…monitor trends in incidence of 
target MDROs in the facility over time 
to determine if MDRO rates are 
decreasing or if additional 
interventions are needed. (IA) 
 
Follow Standard Precautions in all healthcare 
settings. (IB) 
Use of Contact Precautions (CP):  
--- In acute care settings : Implement CP for all 
patients known to be colonized/infected with target 
MDROs.(IB)   
--- In LTCFs: Consider the individual patient’s  clinical 
situation and facility resources  in deciding whether to 
implement CP (II) 
--- In ambulatory and home care settings, follow 
Standard Precautions (II) 
---In hemodialysis units: Follow dialysis specific 
guidelines (IC) 
No recommendation can be made regarding when to 
discontinue CP. (Unresolved issue) 
Masks are not recommended for routine use to 
prevent transmission of MDROs from patients to 
HCWs. Use masks according to Standard 
Precautions when performing splash-generating 
procedures, caring for patients with open 
tracheostomies with potential for projectile secretions, 
and when there is evidence for transmission from 
heavily colonized sources (e.g., burn wounds). 
Patient placement in hospitals and LTCFs: 
When single-patient rooms are available, assign 
priority for these rooms to patients with known or 
suspected MDRO colonization or infection. Give 
highest priority to those patients who have conditions 
that may facilitate transmission, e.g., uncontained 
secretions or excretions. When single-patient rooms 
are not available, cohort patients with the same 
MDRO in the same room or patient-care area. (IB) 
When cohorting patients with the same MDRO is not 
possible, place MDRO patients in rooms with patients 
who are at low risk for acquisition of MDROs and 
associated adverse outcomes from infection and are 
likely to have short lengths of stay. (II)  
 
Follow recommended 
cleaning, disinfection and 
sterilization guidelines for 
maintaining patient care areas 
and equipment. 
Dedicate non-critical medical 
items to use on individual 
patients known to be infected 
or colonized with an MDRO.  
Prioritize room cleaning of 
patients on Contact 
Precautions.  Focus on 
cleaning and disinfecting 
frequently touched surfaces 
(e.g., bed rails, bedside 
commodes, bathroom fixtures 
in patient room, doorknobs) 
and equipment in immediate 









Tier 2.  Recommendations for Intensified MDRO control efforts 
Institute one or more of the interventions described below when 1) incidence or prevalence of MDROs are not decreasing despite the use of routine control measures; or 2) the first case or outbreak of an 
epidemiologically important MDRO (e.g., VRE, MRSA, VISA, VRSA, MDR-GNB) is identified within a healthcare facility or unit (IB) Continue to monitor the incidence of target MDRO infection and 
colonization; if rates do not decrease, implement additional interventions as needed to reduce MDRO transmission. 
Administrative 
Measures/Adherence Monitoring MDRO Education 
Judicious 
Antimicrobial Use Surveillance 
Infection Control Precautions to Prevent 
Transmission Environmental Measures Decolonization 
Obtain expert consultation from persons 
with experience in infection control and 
the epidemiology of MDROS, either in-
house or through outside consultation, 
for assessment of the local MDRO 
problem and guidance in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of 
appropriat4e control measures. (IB) 
Provide necessary leadership, funding 
and day-to-day oversight to implement 
interventions selected. (IB) 
Evaluate healthcare system factors for 
role in creating or perpetuating MDRO 
transmission, including staffing levels, 
education and training, availability of 
consumable and durable resources; 
communication processes, and 
adherence to infection control 
measures.(IB) 
Update healthcare providers and 
administrators on the progress and 





Intensify the frequency of 
educational programs for 
healthcare personnel, 
especially for those who work 
in areas where MDRO rates 
are not decreasing. Provide 
individual or unit-specific 
feedback when available. (IB) 
Review the role of 
antimicrobial use in 
perpetuating the 
MDRO problem 
targeted for intensified 
intervention. Control 
and improve 
antimicrobial use as 
indicated. Antimicrobial 





anaerobic agents for 
VRE; third generation 
cephalosporins for 
ESBLs; and quinolones 
and carbapenems. (IB) 
Calculate and analyze incidence 
rates of target MDROs (single 
isolates/patient; location-, service-
specific) (IB)   
Increase frequency of compiling, 
monitoring antimicrobial susceptibility 
summary reports (II)  
Implement laboratory protocols for 
storing isolates of selected MDROs 
for molecular typing; perform typing if 
needed (IB) 
Develop and implement protocols to 
obtain active surveillance cultures 
from patients in populations at risk. 
(IB) (See recommendations for 
appropriate body sites and culturing 
methods.) 
Conduct culture surveys to assess 
efficacy of intensified MDRO control 
interventions.  
Conduct serial (e.g., weekly) unit-
specific point prevalence culture 
surveys of the target MDRO to 
determine if transmission has 
decreased or ceased.(IB)    
Repeat point-prevalence culture-
surveys at routine intervals and at 
time of patient discharge or transfer 
until transmission has ceased. (IB) 
If indicated by assessment of the 
MDRO problem, collect cultures to 
assess the colonization status of 
roommates and other patients with 
substantial exposure to patients with 
known MDRO infection or 
colonization. (IB) 
Obtain cultures from HCP for target 
MDROs when there is epidemiologic 
evidence implicating the staff member 
as a source of ongoing transmission. 
(IB) 
Use of Contact Precautions: 
Implement Contact Precautions (CP) routinely for 
all patients colonized or infected with a target 
MDRO. (IA) 
Don gowns and gloves before or upon entry to 
the patient’s room or cubicle. (IB) 
In LTCFs, modify CP to allow MDRO-
colonized/infected patients whose site of 
colonization or infection can be appropriately 
contained and who can observe good hand 
hygiene practices to enter common areas and 
participate in group activities 
When active surveillance cultures are obtained as 
part of an intensified  MDRO control program, 
implement CP until the surveillance culture is 
reported negative for the target MDRO (IB)   
No recommendation is made for universal use of 
gloves and/or gowns. (Unresolved issue) 
Implement policies for patient admission and 
placement as needed to prevent transmission of 
the problem MDRO. (IB) 
When single-patient rooms are available, assign 
priority for these rooms to patients with known or 
suspected MDRO colonization or infection. Give 
highest priority to those patients who have conditions 
that may facilitate transmission, e.g., uncontained 
secretions or excretions. When single-patient rooms 
are not available, cohort patients with the same 
MDRO in the same room or patient-care area. (IB) 
When cohorting patients with the same MDRO is not 
possible, place MDRO patients in rooms with patients 
who are at low risk for acquisition of MDROs and 
associated adverse outcomes from infection and are 
likely to have short lengths of stay. (II)  
Stop new admissions to the unit or facility if 
transmission continues despite the 
implementation of the intensified control 
measures. (IB) 
Implement patient.-dedicated 
use of non-critical equipment 
(IB) 
Intensify and reinforce training 
of environmental staff who 
work in areas targeted for 
intensified MDRO control. 
Some facilities may choose to 
assign dedicated staff to 
targeted patient care areas to 
enhance consistency of proper 
environmental cleaning and 
disinfection services (IB) 
Monitor cleaning 
performance to ensure 
consistent cleaning and 
disinfection of surfaces in 
close proximity to the 
patient and those likely to be 
touched by the patient and 
HCWs (e.g., bedrails, carts, 
bedside commodes, 
doorknobs, faucet handles) 
(IB). 
Obtain environmental cultures  
(e.g., surfaces, shared 
equipment) only when 
epidemiologically implicated in 
transmission (IB) 
Vacate units for 
environmental assessment 
and intensive cleaning when 
previous efforts to control 
environmental transmission 
have failed (II) 
 
 
Consult with experts on a 
case-by-case basis 
regarding the appropriate 
use of decolonization 
therapy for patients or 
staff during limited period 
of time as a component of 
an intensified MRSA 
control program (II)  
When decolonization for 
MRSA is used, perform 
susceptibility testing for 
the decolonizing agent 
against the target 




susceptibility to detect 
emergence of resistance 
to the decolonizing agent. 
Consult with 
microbiologists for 
appropriate testing for 
mupirocin resistance, 
since standards have not 
been established. 
Do not use topical 
mupirocin routinely for 
MRSA decolonization of 
patients as a component 
of MRSA control 
programs in any 
healthcare setting. (IB) 
Limit decolonization to 
HCP found to be 
colonized with MRSA who 
have been 
epidemiologically 
implicated in ongoing 
transmission of MRSA to 
patients. (IB) 
No recommendation can 
be made for 
decolonization of patients 
who carry VRE or MDR-
GNB. 
 
       
 
